Summary
The Vermont Supreme Court held that a jury instruction defining harassment as conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be annoyed, irritated, tormented, or alarmed was overly broad in a prosecution for violating a relief-from-abuse order. The court adopted the harassment definition from Vermont’s stalking statute for such prosecutions when the abuse-prevention order provides no specific definition. It reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that harassment included conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be annoyed, irritated, tormented, or alarmed.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for violating the relief-from-abuse order as worded.
Holdings
- When a relief-from-abuse order does not define harassment or specify the type of prohibited conduct, harassment must be construed consistently with the definition in Vermont's stalking statute: conduct directed at a specific person or family member that would cause a reasonable person to fear unlawful sexual conduct, unlawful restraint, bodily injury, or death.
- The instruction allowing conviction based on conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be annoyed, irritated, tormented, or alarmed was erroneous because it permitted conviction for objectively annoying conduct without requiring the threat-related conduct identified in the stalking-statute definition.
- The evidence could not support a conviction because the messages did not contain threats or other conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear unlawful sexual conduct, unlawful restraint, bodily injury, or death.
Key quotations
“We conclude that the instruction was plain error, and that the evidence below could not support a conviction for violating the abuse-prevention order, as worded. We accordingly reverse, and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.” (195 Vt. at 235)
“We construe harassment to mean: actions directed at a specific person, or a member of the person’s family, which would cause a reasonable person to fear unlawful sexual conduct, unlawful restraint, bodily injury, or death, including but not limited to verbal threats, written, telephonic, or other electronically communicated threats, vandalism, or physical contact without consent.” (195 Vt. at 245)
Factual background
Waters and the complainant had previously lived together, shared a minor child, and had ended their relationship after the complainant obtained a relief-from-abuse order. The order prohibited abuse, threats, stalking, and harassment and prohibited direct or indirect communication, but expressly permitted telephone contact without restrictions on frequency, timing, or subject matter. Over approximately thirty-seven days, Waters sent about thirty-seven text messages, many concerning the child or expressing a desire to reconcile; none was profane, threatening, intimidating, violent, or menacing.
Procedural history
The State charged Waters with a second offense of violating a relief-from-abuse order based on approximately thirty-seven text messages and related communications. The trial court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, instructed the jury that harassment included conduct causing a reasonable person to be annoyed, irritated, tormented, or alarmed, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Waters appealed without having objected to the jury instruction at trial.
Remand instructions
Reverse the conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.