Summary
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State in Cherie Hyde’s post-conviction-relief action challenging her conviction for aiding and being an accessory to sexual assault. The court held that the statute of limitations for an accessory charge is the same as that for the underlying principal felony, that counsel’s failure to file a limitations motion was not prejudicial, and that the plea colloquy established a sufficient factual basis under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f).
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether prosecution for aiding in the commission of a felony under 13 V.S.A. § 3 was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying sexual-assault offense.
- Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the felony accessory charge as untimely.
- Whether the trial court complied with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) by establishing a factual basis for Hyde's guilty plea.
Holdings
- An accessory-to-felony charge under 13 V.S.A. § 3 is not a separate and distinct 'other felony' for purposes of 13 V.S.A. § 4501(e); it is subject to the same limitations period as the underlying principal felony.
- Hyde could not establish prejudice from counsel's failure to file a statute-of-limitations motion because such a motion would have been unsuccessful as a matter of law.
- The plea colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11(f) because the court established a factual basis showing that Hyde knowingly and intentionally aided Hulett's sexual assault of the child.
Key quotations
“an accessory to felony charge under 13 V.S.A. § 3 is not a separate and distinct “other felony” for purposes of 13 V.S.A. § 4501(e), as it is not wholly divorced from the principal crime to which the person is allegedly an accessory.” (¶ 11)
“This Court has time and again emphasized that the accessory is in all respects to be treated—in the words of 13 V.S.A. § 3, “punished”—in exactly the same manner as one charged with the principal crime” (¶ 12)
“the defendant must “admit to and possess an understanding of the facts as they relate to the law for all elements of the charge.”” (¶ 21)
“A prior agreement to commit the crime need not be demonstrated by an express agreement, but may be shown by circumstantial evidence of an implied understanding.” (¶ 26)
Factual background
Hyde's daughter disclosed that Mark Hulett had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions while staying overnight in Hyde's home. Hyde admitted that she allowed Hulett to sleep in the same room and bed as her daughter, including after concerns had been raised, and that she once saw Hulett sexually assaulting the child but did nothing to stop him. Hyde was charged, entered a plea agreement to aiding and being an accessory to sexual assault, and received a two-to-ten-year sentence.
Procedural history
Hyde pleaded guilty to aiding and being an accessory to sexual assault under 13 V.S.A. §§ 3 and 3252(c) and received a sentence of two to ten years. In 2013, she sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that defense, and that the plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The Superior Court denied Hyde's motion for summary judgment, granted the State's cross-motion, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.