Summary
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed a final stalking order requiring Stuart Stevens to remain 300 feet from C. Paige Hinkson. The Court held that the alleged repeated masked telephone calls, shipments of books about rape, and observation of Hinkson in a coffee shop did not constitute a qualifying "course of conduct" under Vermont's civil stalking statute. The Court also held that the appeal was not moot because an expired stalking order may carry continuing collateral consequences.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the appeal remained justiciable after the stalking order expired.
- Whether defendant's repeated masked telephone calls constituted monitoring or threats forming part of a statutory course of conduct.
- Whether defendant's shipments of books about rape constituted threats under Vermont's civil stalking statute.
- Whether defendant's emails and published article constituted threats under the civil stalking statute.
- Whether the remaining coffee-shop incident could constitute a statutory course of conduct when it was only one act.
Holdings
- The expiration of a stalking order does not automatically render an appeal moot when the order may continue to cause negative collateral consequences. Defendant established an individualized likelihood of ongoing reputational harm, so the appeal remained justiciable.
- Because Vermont's civil stalking statute mirrors the criminal stalking statute in material respects and reaches the same conduct, the civil statute must be construed narrowly and ambiguities resolved in the defendant's favor under the rule of lenity.
- The repeated masked telephone calls did not constitute monitoring or threats under 12 V.S.A. § 5131(1)(A) on the facts of this case and therefore could not constitute acts in a statutory course of conduct.
- Sending books about rape to plaintiff's home did not constitute threats under the civil stalking statute because the communications did not express an intent to inflict physical harm.
- The emails and the article urging the community to shun men accused of sexual misconduct did not constitute threats of physical harm and therefore could not serve as predicate acts in a statutory course of conduct.
- The single coffee-shop incident could not establish a statutory course of conduct because the statute requires two or more acts, even assuming the incident constituted monitoring.
Key quotations
“Construing the terms of § 5131 narrowly because it mirrors the criminal stalking statute, we conclude that defendant’s conduct in this case does not rise to the level of stalking, and therefore reverse.” (¶ 1)
“The Legislature clearly intended to prohibit behaviors that involved keeping track of plaintiff, her activities, or her whereabouts.” (¶ 40)
“Defendant’s conduct may have been intrusive and bullying, but was not a threat of physical harm.” (¶ 47)
Factual background
Defendant repeatedly called plaintiff's cell phone from masked numbers, sent three shipments of books about rape to the home plaintiff shared with her husband, and stared at plaintiff in a coffee shop. He also sent communications criticizing plaintiff's husband and urging others to shun him based on sexual-assault allegations. The trial court found that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff substantial emotional distress and issued a stalking order.
Procedural history
Plaintiff filed a complaint for an order against stalking under 12 V.S.A. § 5133. After a two-day hearing, the Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had stalked plaintiff and issued a six-month protective order. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot despite expiration of the order, reversed the trial court's decision, and vacated the stalking order.
Remand instructions
The Court reversed the trial court's decision and vacated the stalking order. No further remand instructions were stated.