Summary
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that uninsured motorist coverage applied to injuries sustained when an uninsured motorist struck the insured with a car door. The court concluded that the vehicle was being used in a manner for which it was designed and that the use was causally related to the injury, regardless of the tortfeasor's intent.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether injuries caused when an uninsured motorist forcefully opened a car door arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of Virginia's uninsured motorist statute and policy.
- Whether the uninsured motorist's intent to use the vehicle or its door as a weapon precluded uninsured motorist coverage.
Holdings
- The tortfeasor's intent is irrelevant to the existence of uninsured motorist coverage; the determinative inquiry is the nature of the uninsured vehicle's employment.
- An injury caused by a car door being opened or closed in the manner for which it was designed arises out of the use of the uninsured vehicle as a vehicle when there is a causal relationship between that use and the injury.
- The policy afforded uninsured motorist coverage because Gibson used the car door as designed and that use was causally related to Sleigh's injury.
Key quotations
“Thus, it is clear that in Virginia the intent of the uninsured tortfeasor is irrelevant to the question of coverage; rather, the determinative issue is the nature of the employment of the uninsured vehicle.” (p. 4)
“Car doors are designed and manufactured to be opened and closed.” (p. 5)
Factual background
Betty L. Sleigh, a City of Alexandria parking-enforcement officer, was issuing a citation to a vehicle parked in violation of a street-cleaning ordinance. Crystal A. Gibson repeatedly opened the vehicle's driver's-side door while entering and exiting to obtain keys, ultimately forcing the door into Sleigh and driving her into a police vehicle, causing a permanent back injury. Gibson then took off in the vehicle, which was uninsured, and Sleigh sought recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of her personal automobile policy.
Procedural history
Sleigh filed a motion for judgment against Crystal A. Gibson for her injuries. Fireman's Fund then sought a declaratory judgment that its uninsured motorist coverage did not apply. The parties submitted the matter to the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria on stipulated undisputed facts, Sleigh's deposition, and the insurance policy. The circuit court ruled that coverage existed and dismissed the insurer's motion for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.