Hannah Leigh Evans, An Infant, Who Sues by Her Mother, Natural Guardian and Next Friend, Cynthia Kay Stevens v. Billy Bradley Evans, II

Summary

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 preclude a negligence per se claim based on the failure to secure a child in a child restraint device, but do not abrogate a common-law negligence action arising from the child's injuries. The Court reversed the Circuit Court of Bedford County's dismissal on demurrer and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Kinser dissented, concluding that the statutory language barred the common-law negligence claim at issue.

Holdings

1. Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 preclude a cause of action based on negligence per se, but they do not abrogate a common-law negligence cause of action arising from injuries sustained by a child in a motor-vehicle accident.
2. The statutes preclude any mention of their provisions by the parties at trial for any reason in the common-law negligence action.
3. A four-year-old child is not legally capable of contributory negligence.
4. In an infant's personal-injury action, the negligence of a parent is not imputed to the infant child.
5. A four-year-old child is unable, as a matter of law, to mitigate her damages.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 preclude a common-law negligence action based on an adult's failure to secure a child in a child-restraint device.
2. Whether the statutes preclude evidence or comment at trial concerning the statutory child-restraint requirements.
3. Whether a four-year-old child may be found contributorily negligent or legally responsible for failing to mitigate personal-injury damages.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded