Doe v. Baker

Summary

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the dismissal of Jane Doe’s amended complaint alleging that a former church pastor sexually battered her and that church defendants were liable under theories including negligent hiring or retention and vicarious liability. The court held that negligent hiring or retention claims based on the pastor’s original 1995 hiring were insufficient, but claims based on hiring or retention after his 2011 retirement were sufficiently pleaded. It also held that the allegations created a rebuttable presumption supporting vicarious-liability claims and remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. A negligent hiring or negligent retention claim is not viable for conduct committed after the alleged employee is no longer retained by the defendant employer. Termination of the employment relationship is the boundary of employer liability for these torts.
2. The complaint sufficiently stated negligent hiring or retention claims to the extent they were based on the church hiring or retaining King as an employee or agent after he retired as pastor in 2011.
3. The allegations did not sufficiently state a negligent hiring claim based on King's original hiring in 1995 because they did not allege facts showing that the defendants knew or should have known of a risk that the specific danger—a sexual battery—would occur.
4. The individual church officials could not be liable for negligent hiring or retention because those torts are claims against an employer, and the complaint did not allege that the individual officials were King's employer.
5. The allegations that King acted as an employee or agent, provided spiritual advice and comfort, and committed the sexual touching under that guise were sufficient to withstand demurrer on vicarious liability and scope of employment.
6. The complaint did not state a claim that King acted with apparent authority when he committed the alleged sexual battery because no reasonable person would believe that the church authorized him to engage in sexual battery.
7. The complaint did not state a claim for gross or willful and wanton negligence based on the church defendants' response to reports of King's conduct.
8. The complaint sufficiently stated a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because it alleged emotional disturbance, physical injury, and a clear and unbroken causal connection, subject to proof of an underlying tort duty and breach.
9. The complaint did not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged failure to take measures stronger than counseling did not constitute conduct sufficiently outrageous and intolerable.
10. The complaint did not state a fraud-by-nondisclosure claim because it did not allege intentional concealment and the defendants owed no duty to disclose the complaints about King to Jane or other congregants.
11. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to amend.

Questions Presented

1. Whether negligent hiring or retention claims remain viable when the alleged tort occurs after the tortfeasor has retired from the position for which he was originally hired.
2. Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that King remained an employee or agent, or was rehired or retained in such a role, at the time of the alleged sexual battery.
3. Whether the complaint sufficiently pleaded negligent hiring based on King's original hiring in 1995.
4. Whether individual church officials could be liable for negligent hiring or retention when they were not alleged to be King's employer.
5. Whether the allegations sufficiently pleaded vicarious liability and that King's conduct occurred within the scope of employment.
6. Whether the complaint stated a claim based on apparent authority for a sexual battery committed by King.
7. Whether the allegations stated claims for gross or willful and wanton negligence.
8. Whether the complaint sufficiently pleaded negligent infliction of emotional distress.
9. Whether the complaint sufficiently pleaded intentional infliction of emotional distress.
10. Whether the complaint stated a fraud-by-nondisclosure claim.
11. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying further leave to amend.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded