Donovan v. Pruitt, 36 Wash. App. 324

Summary

The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of purchasers’ claims against a builder for defective foundation construction. The court held that the implied warranty of habitability arose by operation of law rather than from the written sale contract, that the applicable limitations period had expired, and that the builder was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.

Holdings

1. The implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use does not arise out of the written contract evidencing the sale of the house and therefore is not governed by the six-year limitations period for actions upon a contract in writing under RCW 4.16.040(1).
2. RCW 4.16.310 is a statute of repose, or statute of abrogation, that limits the time within which a construction-related claim must accrue; it is not a conventional statute of limitations measuring the period from accrual to filing. The Donovans' claim accrued by spring 1976, within six years after substantial completion of the house, so it was not barred by RCW 4.16.310's accrual limitation.
3. Pruitt was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because the evidence did not show that his conduct fraudulently or inequitably induced the Donovans to delay filing until the limitations period expired.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use arose out of the written sale contract and therefore was governed by Washington's six-year limitations period for actions upon a contract in writing.
2. Whether RCW 4.16.300-.320 governed accrual and limitations of the Donovans' construction-defect claim.
3. Whether Pruitt was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because of his conduct concerning repairs.

Disposition

affirmed