In re the Personal Restraint of Stenson

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court considers Darold J. Stenson’s personal restraint petition challenging his convictions and death sentence for the aggravated murders of Denise Stenson and Frank Hoerner. Stenson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, including an irreconcilable conflict with counsel, inadequate investigation and witness presentation, and deficiencies in the guilt and penalty phases. The court denied the petition, concluding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally ineffective.

Holdings

1. Stenson failed to establish an irreconcilable attorney-client conflict that denied him effective assistance of counsel or justified presumed prejudice.
2. The Sixth Amendment does not give a defendant a constitutional right to control counsel's strategic and tactical decisions or to compel counsel to use the defendant's preferred theory of defense.
3. Stenson was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the in camera proceeding on his request for substitute counsel.
4. A disagreement over trial strategy between appointed counsel and client does not, without more, violate the professional-conduct rule concerning conflicts of interest or require counsel's withdrawal.
5. Stenson failed to prove deficient performance and prejudice from counsel's decisions not to call particular witnesses or present additional evidence.
6. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination protects silence on the issue of guilt and does not apply to counsel's penalty-phase argument after guilt has been determined.
7. Counsel was not ineffective for declining to present evidence accusing Denise Hoerner because the proffered material was inadmissible or did not clearly point to another person as the perpetrator.

Questions Presented

1. Whether an actual conflict of interest or irreconcilable conflict between Stenson and appointed counsel adversely affected counsel's performance.
2. Whether a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to control trial tactics and the theory of defense.
3. Whether counsel's opposition to Stenson's request for substitute counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.
4. Whether Stenson was denied counsel at a critical stage during the in camera substitution-of-counsel proceeding.
5. Whether counsel violated a fundamental duty by failing to timely move to withdraw.
6. Whether counsel was ineffective for declining to call witnesses during the guilt phase and for failing to present specified guilt- and penalty-phase evidence.
7. Whether counsel's failure to rebut evidence concerning Stenson's lack of grief and relationship with his wife constituted ineffective assistance.
8. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence concerning the profitability of Dakota Farms.
9. Whether counsel was ineffective concerning the proposed lingering-doubt instruction.
10. Whether counsel's penalty-phase argument violated Stenson's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
11. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to present other-suspect evidence.
12. Whether counsel was ineffective in preparing for evidence concerning Stenson's jeans and the blood-spatter evidence.
13. Whether counsel was ineffective in preparing for and examining medical examiner Dr. Brady.

Disposition

writ_denied