Summary
The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the legal and factual sufficiency of two charges in a recall petition against a fire district commissioner. The court held that allegations concerning the unlawful division of a culvert project to avoid competitive bidding requirements were sufficient to proceed, while allegations concerning the removal of a disruptive citizen from a public meeting were legally insufficient because the board had reasonable legal justification. The court reversed the trial court and allowed the recall process to proceed only on the competitive-bidding charge.
Holdings
- The first recall charge was factually sufficient because, viewed as a whole and with the supporting affidavits, it identified the approximate time, nature, and circumstances of Kast's alleged unlawful conduct and alleged facts showing knowledge of an intent to violate the law.
- The first charge was legally sufficient because Kast's alleged vote to divide the project and subsequent hiring of a contractor in violation of the competitive-bidding law constituted substantial wrongful conduct amounting to malfeasance or misfeasance.
- The second recall charge was factually sufficient because it identified the removal of Osterhouse from the meeting and the involvement of the board and sheriff, even though the parties disputed who specifically ordered the removal.
- The second charge was legally insufficient because Kast and VanSteertegem had a reasonable legal justification and exercised reasonable discretion in removing Osterhouse from the public meeting.
Questions Presented
- Whether the recall charge alleging that Kast unlawfully divided the culvert project and violated the state competitive-bidding law was factually sufficient.
- Whether that competitive-bidding charge was legally sufficient to constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.
- Whether the recall charge alleging that Kast violated the Open Public Meetings Act by removing Osterhouse from a public meeting was factually sufficient.
- Whether the Open Public Meetings Act charge was legally sufficient where the board had a reasonable legal justification for removing a disruptive or threatening individual.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (11)
- In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 764-65, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000)(followed)
- Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984)(followed)
- In re Recall of Beasley, 128 Wn.2d 419, 427, 908 P.2d 878 (1996)(followed)
- In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wn.2d 544, 549, 799 P.2d 1179 (1990)(followed)
- Herron v. McClanahan, 28 Wn. App. 552, 560, 625 P.2d 707 (1981)(followed)
- Skidmore v. Fuller, 59 Wn.2d 818, 823-24, 370 P.2d 975 (1962)(followed)
- In re Recall of Call, 109 Wn.2d 954, 958, 749 P.2d 674 (1988)(distinguished)
- Greco v. Parsons, 105 Wn.2d 669, 671-72, 717 P.2d 1368 (1986)(followed)
- In re Recall of Hurley, 120 Wn.2d 378, 381, 841 P.2d 756 (1992)(followed)
- In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 672, 953 P.2d 82 (1998)(distinguished)
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Cited In (0)
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