Summary
The Washington Supreme Court held that refusing to hire an applicant because of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, absent business necessity or a valid bona fide occupational qualification. The court rejected applying a disability-accommodation analysis to pregnancy-related discrimination claims and held that the employer violated statutory prohibitions against pregnancy-based hiring discrimination and preemployment pregnancy inquiries.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether pregnancy-related employment discrimination claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination are analyzed as sex-discrimination claims rather than disability-discrimination claims.
- Whether a disability-style accommodation analysis applies to a pregnancy-related employment discrimination claim.
- Whether Fibre's refusal to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy violated RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i).
- Whether Fibre's inquiry into Hegwine's pregnancy status during a preemployment medical examination violated RCW 49.60.180(4) and WAC 162-12-140(3)(n).
- Whether Hegwine was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.60.030(2).
Holdings
- Pregnancy-related employment discrimination claims under the WLAD are matters of sex discrimination, not disability discrimination, and are not subject to a disability-style accommodation analysis.
- Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i) by refusing to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy.
- Fibre failed to establish a valid BFOQ defense to its refusal to hire Hegwine.
- Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(4) and WAC 162-12-140(3)(n) by requiring Hegwine to disclose her pregnancy during a preemployment medical examination.
- Hegwine is entitled to attorney fees and expenses under RCW 49.60.030(2).
Key quotations
“These laws do not call for an accommodation analysis like that applicable to disability related employment discrimination claims; hence, no such analysis is applicable, or appropriate, in evaluating a pregnancy related employment discrimination claim.” (345)
“Together, the plain language of these laws establishes that refusing to hire a person because of her pregnancy constitutes unlawful sex discrimination, unless the refusal is based upon a business necessity or the employer proves a valid bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).” (353-354)
“Reasonable minds could not differ given this evidence, and therefore, as a matter of law, Hegwine established that Fibre’s claim of business necessity was pretextual.” (357)
Factual background
Longview Fibre offered Stacy Hegwine a clerk/order checker position conditioned on completion of a company physical examination. The examination required disclosure of pregnancy, after which Fibre sought increasingly restrictive and undisclosed lifting requirements and ultimately withdrew the employment offer, stating that Hegwine's availability did not permit her to perform the job. Fibre later asserted that the decision was based on a 60-pound lifting requirement, although the job advertisement listed no lifting requirement and the requirement changed after Fibre learned of Hegwine's pregnancy.
Procedural history
Hegwine sued Longview Fibre alleging violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Fibre under a disability-discrimination analysis. The Court of Appeals reversed, held that the claim was pregnancy-related sex discrimination, awarded attorney fees, and remanded solely for determination of damages. The Washington Supreme Court granted Fibre's petition for review, affirmed the Court of Appeals, and remanded for determination of damages.
Remand instructions
Affirm the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the trial court and remand to the trial court solely for determination of damages. Hegwine is also entitled to attorney fees.