Summary
The Washington Supreme Court held that a search warrant is not invalid under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution merely because the affiant negligently or inadvertently omitted material facts from the warrant application. Following Franks v. Delaware, the court required a showing that material omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals and upheld the convictions of Randal Lee Chenoweth and Barbara Joyce Wood.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution invalidates a search warrant when the affiant negligently, but not recklessly or intentionally, omits material facts from the warrant application.
- Whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that the prosecutor did not recklessly omit material information about the informant.
- Whether the warrant was facially invalid because the affidavit lacked adequate indicia of the informant's reliability.
Holdings
- Under article I, section 7, material misstatements or omissions invalidate a search warrant only when they are made recklessly or intentionally; negligence or inadvertence alone is insufficient.
- The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecutor did not recklessly omit material facts concerning Parker's criminal history or prior status as a paid informant.
- The search warrant was facially valid because the informant's self-identification and appearance for an interview, statements against penal interest, detailed firsthand observations, and circumstances explaining his presence and motive provided adequate indicia of reliability.
Key quotations
“Accordingly, we hold that under article I, section 7, only material falsehoods or omissions made recklessly or intentionally will invalidate a search warrant.” (at 608)
“Accordingly, we hold that the search warrant is valid on its face.” (at 610)
“Under article I, section 7 material misstatements or omissions will invalidate a search warrant only when made recklessly or intentionally.” (at 611)
Factual background
Nicholas Parker contacted police and identified Randal Chenoweth as operating a methamphetamine laboratory at a specified Lynden property. Parker provided his identity and address, appeared for an interview, described chemicals and equipment he had observed in the garage, and admitted participating in methamphetamine-related conduct with Chenoweth and Barbara Wood. A prosecutor disclosed Parker's known drug conviction but did not disclose additional information about his criminal history and prior work as a paid informant. A magistrate issued a telephonic warrant, and the defendants later moved to suppress the resulting evidence.
Procedural history
The trial court denied the defendants' suppression motions after finding that the warrant affiants had not recklessly or intentionally omitted material information concerning the informant. The Court of Appeals affirmed in the pertinent respects, and the Supreme Court of Washington granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrant was not invalid under article I, section 7 and was facially supported by sufficient indicia of informant reliability.