State v. Chavez

163 Wash. 2d 262 (2008) · Supreme Court of Washington · March 20, 2008

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court held that a juvenile charged with violent or serious violent offenses does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. The court also held that the legislature did not violate separation of powers by failing to define assault and allowing the judiciary to develop the crime’s elements through the common law.

Court
Supreme Court of Washington
Writing for the Court
C. Johnson, J.; Alexander, C.J.; Owens, J.; Fairhurst, J.; J.M. Johnson, J.; Bridge, J. Pro Tem.
Jurisdiction
Washington
Decision date
March 20, 2008
Procedural posture
A juvenile appealed his adjudications and disposition after a bench trial in juvenile court, arguing that juveniles charged with serious or violent offenses have a constitutional right to a jury trial and that the judicial development of the elements of assault violated separation of powers. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals' affirmance.
Standard of review
Constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.
Precedential value
Published Washington Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Azel L. Chavez v. State of Washington
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurejury selectionconstitutional lawstatutory interpretationseparation of powers

Practice areas

Criminal lawJuvenile lawConstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a juvenile charged with violent or serious violent offenses has a constitutional right to a jury trial even though other juvenile proceedings are conducted without juries.
  2. Whether the legislature's failure to define assault, coupled with the judiciary's development of the elements of assault through common law, violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.

Holdings

  1. A juvenile charged with violent or serious violent offenses has no constitutional right to a jury trial in Washington juvenile proceedings because the juvenile justice system remains sufficiently distinct from the adult criminal system and retains a rehabilitative emphasis.
  2. The legislature did not violate separation of powers by failing to provide a general statutory definition of assault and permitting courts to define assault through the common law.

Key quotations

We hold that the juvenile justice system has not been so altered that juveniles charged with violent and serious violent offenses have the right to a jury trial. (at 272)
We also affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the legislature did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by permitting the judiciary to define through common law the elements of assault. (at 274)

Factual background

At age fourteen, Azel L. Chavez was charged in juvenile court with three counts of attempted first degree murder and several other serious or violent firearm-related offenses. The State sought discretionary decline of juvenile jurisdiction, but the motion was denied after psychological experts for both sides opined that Chavez would be better served by remaining in the juvenile system. After a bench trial, Chavez was adjudicated guilty on all seven counts and received a standard-range juvenile disposition of 309 to 387 weeks plus a firearm enhancement.

Procedural history

Chavez was charged in juvenile court with attempted first degree murder and other firearm-related offenses. The juvenile court denied the State's motion to decline jurisdiction, conducted a bench trial, found Chavez guilty on all counts, and imposed a disposition of 309 to 387 weeks plus a 12-month firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Court Document

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