Summary
The Washington Supreme Court held that RCW 9A.46.020’s threats-to-kill provision must be limited to constitutionally unprotected “true threats.” Because the jury instructions omitted the requirement that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would foresee the statements being interpreted as a serious expression of intent to carry out the threat, the error was a manifest constitutional error and was not harmless. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that sufficient evidence supported retrial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Washington's threats-to-kill harassment statute must be construed to criminalize only constitutionally defined true threats.
- Whether the jury instructions were constitutionally deficient because they did not require the jury to find that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would foresee that the statements would be interpreted as serious expressions of intent to inflict bodily harm or kill.
- Whether the instructional error was manifest and affected a constitutional right despite Schaler's failure to object at trial.
- Whether the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to permit retrial rather than requiring dismissal under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Holdings
- The threats-to-kill provision of Washington's harassment statute must be construed, consistent with the First Amendment, to proscribe only true threats.
- The jury instructions were constitutionally deficient because they did not require proof that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would foresee that the statements or acts would be interpreted as serious expressions of an intent to carry out the threat.
- The instructional error was manifest and affected a constitutional right, so it was reviewable despite Schaler's failure to object at trial.
- The omission of the true-threat requirement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Retrial was permitted because the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the statements were true threats.
Key quotations
“A true threat is “a statement made in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of another person.”” (169 Wn.2d at 283)
“The threats-to-kill provision therefore requires proof that the defendant was (at least) negligent as to his threats’ effect on listeners.” (169 Wn.2d at 293)
Factual background
Schaler contacted a crisis-services counselor while upset and claimed that he had killed or might kill his neighbors. During a subsequent mental-health evaluation, he repeatedly said that he wanted to kill two neighbors, referred to planning their deaths, and made additional statements about violence and a future bloodbath. The statements arose during a mental-health crisis and were inconsistent and sometimes self-contradictory; the counselor nevertheless considered them viable threats and warned the neighbors. The prosecution relied on these statements and an earlier dispute involving Schaler's use of a chainsaw near one neighbor.
Procedural history
Schaler was charged with two counts under RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (b), and (2)(b)(ii), was convicted, and received concurrent 10-month sentences. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and, for the first time, the omission of a true-threat instruction. The Court of Appeals found instructional error but affirmed on harmless-error grounds and held the evidence sufficient. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Remand instructions
Reverse Schaler's convictions and remand for a new trial under jury instructions requiring the State to prove the constitutionally required true-threat standard.