In re the Detention of Danforth, 173 Wash. 2d 59

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Robert Danforth's motion for summary judgment in a sexually violent predator civil commitment proceeding. The court held that his explicit statements describing intended sexual offenses could constitute a "threat" and therefore a "recent overt act" under former RCW 71.09.020(10). It also held that the applicable civil commitment provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.

Holdings

1. A threat under former RCW 71.09.020(10) means an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another. A recent overt act may consist of either an act or a threat; the State need not prove both.
2. Summary judgment was properly denied because, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the State's favor, a legally sufficient basis existed for a reasonable jury to find that Danforth expressed an intention to inflict loss or harm and committed a recent overt act.
3. Former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), was not unconstitutionally overbroad because the civil commitment statute did not criminalize or regulate speech and did not implicate First Amendment concerns.
4. Former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Danforth and provided ascertainable standards against arbitrary enforcement.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Danforth's statements, viewed in the context of his conduct, criminal history, and mental condition, could constitute a threat and therefore a recent overt act under former RCW 71.09.020(10).
2. Whether the trial court properly denied summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find that Danforth committed a recent overt act.
3. Whether former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.
4. Whether the statutory definition of recent overt act was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Danforth.
5. Whether the statute satisfied due process by requiring proof of present dangerousness before involuntary civil commitment.

Disposition

affirmed