Summary
The Washington Supreme Court held that the City of Sumner’s juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that terms such as “remain,” “linger,” “stay,” and the undefined exemption for a parent-directed “errand” failed to provide adequate notice or sufficiently clear enforcement standards, and it reversed Thomas Walsh’s convictions.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Washington Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review Walsh's constitutional challenge when neither the juvenile nor the attorney general was a party.
- Whether materials submitted by the city that were not part of the record on review could be considered.
- Whether Sumner's juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because the terms "remain," "linger," "stay," and "errand" failed to provide fair notice and adequate enforcement standards.
- Whether the ordinance violated the constitutional rights of juveniles to move freely in public places or parents to rear their children.
Holdings
- A defendant may assert a constitutional challenge to an element of the offense charged, and neither the juvenile nor the attorney general was an indispensable party to Walsh's appeal.
- The court would not consider the police chief's testimony and memorandum because they were not part of the record on review and the city did not properly supplement the record.
- Sumner's juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and therefore void because the terms "remain," "linger," and "stay," together with the undefined "errand" exemption, failed to provide ordinary people fair notice of prohibited conduct and failed to constrain police discretion.
Key quotations
“To avoid unconstitutional vagueness, an ordinance must (1) define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited; and (2) establish standards to permit police to enforce the law in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner.” (at 499)
“In sum, an ordinance which affords a police officer broad discretion to determine if a juvenile is in violation when tying his or her shoe or pumping gas does not withstand a vagueness challenge.” (at 500)
“Accordingly, we hold that its ordinance that makes it unlawful for juveniles to “remain” in a public place during certain hours and prohibits parents from permitting their juvenile children to do the same is unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void.” (at 502)
Factual background
At approximately 1:46 a.m. on July 25, 1999, police found Walsh's fourteen-year-old son, Justin, at a Sumner convenience store during curfew hours. Walsh told police that Justin had permission to be at the store, but Walsh was cited after Justin was later found returning to the store. On July 30, 1999, police again found Justin out during curfew hours, and he stated that he was going to the store to obtain Advil for his father; Walsh again confirmed that he had given permission. Walsh was convicted of two violations of Sumner's parental-responsibility curfew provision.
Procedural history
The Sumner Municipal Court found that Walsh knowingly permitted his fourteen-year-old son to remain in a public place during curfew hours and imposed two $50 fines. The Pierce County Superior Court affirmed the convictions, remanding at the city's request for determination of factual precedent. After the remand hearing, Walsh sought discretionary review; the Court of Appeals transferred the petition to the Washington Supreme Court, which granted review, struck materials outside the record, rejected the city's jurisdiction and indispensable-party arguments, and reversed the convictions.