State v. Day

161 Wash. 2d 889 (2007) · Washington Supreme Court · October 11, 2007

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court held that an officer may not conduct a Terry stop based solely on suspicion of a parking or other civil infraction. Because the deputy lacked grounds for a lawful Terry stop, the associated frisk and vehicle search were unlawful, requiring suppression of the seized evidence and vacation of the defendant’s methamphetamine-manufacturing conviction without prejudice.

Court
Washington Supreme Court
Writing for the Court
Chambers, J.; Alexander, C.J.; C. Johnson, J.; Sanders, J.; Owens, J.; J.M. Johnson, J.
Jurisdiction
Washington
Decision date
October 11, 2007
Procedural posture
After the trial court denied Day's motion to suppress evidence and he was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted review and reversed.
Standard of review
The court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law on a suppression motion de novo.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Charlie Day v. State of Washington
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

suppression of evidencesearch and seizurefourth amendmentcriminal procedurewarrant requirement

Practice areas

criminal lawconstitutional lawsearch and seizure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a suspected parking-permit violation or other civil infraction provides constitutional authority for a Terry investigative stop under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
  2. Whether the resulting frisk and search were lawful when the initial Terry stop lacked constitutional authority.
  3. Whether the evidence obtained from the vehicle should be suppressed and Day's conviction vacated.

Holdings

  1. When officers merely suspect that a civil parking infraction has been committed, that suspicion does not provide authority for a Terry stop under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
  2. Because the initial Terry stop was unlawful, the officer had no authority to conduct a Terry frisk of Day or his wife.
  3. The evidence seized from Day's vehicle was inadmissible, and Day's conviction had to be vacated without prejudice and the matter remanded.

Key quotations

When officers merely suspect a civil infraction has been committed, there is no ground for a Terry stop. (898)
Neither legislative labeling nor judicial creativity can change the fact that Deputy Hayter suspected a parking infraction, not a traffic infraction. (898)

Factual background

A sheriff's deputy approached Day's car, which was backed into shrubbery along the Yakima River in an improved access facility where vehicles were required to display parking permits. The deputy observed an empty handgun case, asked Day about a gun, ordered Day and his wife out of the vehicle, frisked and handcuffed Day, and searched the car after another officer arrived. The search uncovered a handgun, and after dispatch reported that it was stolen and that Day's wife had an outstanding arrest warrant, officers discovered evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing during a search incident to arrest.

Procedural history

A Benton County trial court admitted evidence discovered during a warrantless detention, frisk, and vehicle search and convicted Day of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Washington Supreme Court held that the suspected parking infraction did not support a Terry stop, reversed the admission of the evidence, vacated the conviction without prejudice, and remanded.

Remand instructions

Vacate the conviction without prejudice and conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion after excluding the evidence seized from Day's vehicle.

Court Document

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