Summary
The Washington Supreme Court considered whether a vehicular homicide conviction entered when the offense was a class B felony became a class A felony after legislative reclassification. The court held that the statutory saving clause prevented retroactive application of the reclassification, so Rivard’s conviction remained a class B felony. The court also held that Rivard was eligible under RCW 9.41.040 to petition for restoration of his firearm rights and reinstated the trial court’s order.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the 1996 reclassification of vehicular homicide from a class B felony to a class A felony applied retroactively to Rivard's 1993 conviction for purposes of RCW 9.41.040.
- Whether RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i)'s reference to "prior felony convictions" includes the disabling felony conviction itself or only felony convictions predating that offense.
- Whether Rivard was eligible to petition for restoration of his firearm-possession rights.
Holdings
- The 1996 reclassification of vehicular homicide from a class B felony to a class A felony did not retroactively convert Rivard's 1993 conviction into a class A felony. His conviction remained a class B felony under the law in effect when he committed the offense.
- The phrase "prior felony convictions" refers to felony convictions occurring before the disabling offense; it does not include the disabling felony conviction itself.
- Rivard was eligible to petition for restoration of his firearm-possession rights because his disabling conviction was a class B felony, he had no prior felony convictions, and more than five crime-free years had elapsed before his petition.
Key quotations
“Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of an offense from a class B to a class A felony has no effect on a prior conviction for that offense and does not retroactively convert the conviction to a class A felony.” (at 782)
“The trial court’s interpretation — where “prior felony convictions” refers only to felonies occurring prior to the disabling offense — makes logical use of all the language in RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i).” (at 784)
Factual background
Rivard committed vehicular homicide in December 1993, when Washington classified the offense as a class B felony and did not prohibit firearm possession based on that conviction. He pleaded guilty in June 1997, received a sentence of 90 days' partial confinement and two years of supervised release, and was discharged in 1999. In 2006, with no criminal history other than the vehicular homicide conviction, he petitioned to restore his firearm-possession rights after the offense had been reclassified as a class A felony.
Procedural history
Rivard pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide committed in 1993 and was sentenced in 1997. In 2006 he petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights. The trial court granted the petition; the Court of Appeals initially affirmed, then reversed on reconsideration, holding that Rivard was ineligible because vehicular homicide had later been reclassified as a class A felony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's decision.
Remand instructions
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's order restoring Rivard's firearm-possession rights.