State v. Gentry

183 Wn. 2d 749 (2015) · Washington Supreme Court · August 20, 2015

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Jonathan Lee Gentry’s request for additional postconviction DNA testing in his aggravated first degree murder case. The court held that Gentry failed to preserve a statutory affidavit-of-prejudice claim and that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by declining to recuse. Although the trial court applied an incorrect standard by rejecting a presumption that further DNA testing would be favorable, the court held that the denial was sustainable because the inculpatory DNA result from a shoelace could be considered in determining whether further testing was warranted.

Court
Washington Supreme Court
Writing for the Court
Stephens, J.; Madsen, C.J.; Johnson, J.; Owens, J.; Fairhurst, J.; Wiggins, J.; Yu, J.; Johanson, J. Pro Tem.; Maxa, J. Pro Tem.
Jurisdiction
Washington
Decision date
August 20, 2015
Procedural posture
Gentry directly appealed the Kitsap County Superior Court's order denying further postconviction DNA testing and denying his request that the assigned judge recuse herself.
Standard of review
Recusal decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Decisions on motions for postconviction DNA testing are also reviewed for abuse of discretion; applying an incorrect legal standard or relying on facts unsupported by the record constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Jonathan Lee Gentry v. State of Washington
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefevidencestatutory interpretationappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

criminal procedurepost-conviction reliefevidenceappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Gentry preserved a claim that the trial judge was required to recuse herself under Washington's statutory affidavit-of-prejudice procedure.
  2. Whether the trial judge abused her discretion under the appearance-of-fairness doctrine by declining to recuse herself.
  3. Whether RCW 10.73.170 requires courts to presume that requested DNA testing would produce favorable and exculpatory results when evaluating a convicted person's request for postconviction DNA testing.
  4. Whether a trial court may consider newly obtained inculpatory DNA results when deciding whether to terminate further postconviction DNA testing.
  5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying further DNA testing despite having initially applied an incorrect legal standard.

Holdings

  1. Gentry failed to preserve his claim that the trial judge was required to treat his recusal request as an affidavit of prejudice because he did not present that statutory theory to the trial court.
  2. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to recuse herself based on her former employment in the prosecutor's office and her husband's former employment with the police department.
  3. RCW 10.73.170(3) requires courts to presume that the requested DNA evidence would be favorable to the convicted person when determining whether testing is likely to demonstrate innocence.
  4. A trial court may consider all relevant evidence, including newly obtained DNA test results, when deciding whether to terminate further postconviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170.
  5. The denial of further DNA testing was sustainable because the trial court alternatively applied the correct standard and reasonably concluded that the shoelace DNA result, considered with the trial evidence and presumed favorable results from remaining testing, did not show innocence on a more-probable-than-not basis.

Key quotations

We find that a trial court may consider new DNA test results in deciding whether to allow further DNA testing. (753)
We hold that Judge Forbes acted within her discretion in determining that Gentry could not demonstrate probable innocence in light of the result of the DNA test on the shoelace, even assuming the remaining DNA evidence would be favorable to him. (753)
In light of this court’s decision in Crumpton, the trial court erred in relying on its reading of Riofta to reject a favorable presumption. (764)
Though the court recited an incorrect legal standard, the order also rested on application of the correct standard and the sustainable conclusion that further DNA testing would not demonstrate Gentry’s innocence on a more probable than not basis. (769)

Factual background

Gentry was convicted of the 1988 aggravated first degree murder of 12-year-old Cassie Holden and sentenced to death. Evidence at trial included blood on shoes and shoelaces seized from Gentry's residence, along with eyewitness and jailhouse-confession testimony. During postconviction DNA testing, a bloodstained shoelace produced a DNA profile matching Holden's, with an estimated random-match probability of 1 in 110 trillion. Gentry sought further testing and requested recusal of the assigned judge because of her former employment in the prosecutor's office and her husband's former work with the local police department.

Procedural history

Gentry was convicted of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1991. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 1995 and denied two personal restraint petitions in 1999 and 2014. In 2011, the superior court granted Gentry's motion for postconviction DNA testing; after a DNA test of a shoelace matched the victim's blood profile, the State moved to end further testing. The superior court granted that motion and denied recusal, and Gentry timely appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.

Court Document

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