West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Douglas R. Veach, et al.

Summary

This document is a concurring opinion by Justice Ketchum of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Douglas R. Veach. The concurrence addresses the meaning of “mineral” in instruments conveying or reserving interests in land, advocating a broad definition based on the parties’ general intent to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate. It also discusses the respective rights and duties of mineral-estate and surface-estate owners, while noting that the mineral-definition issue was not reached by the majority because it had been stipulated and was not preserved for appeal.

Holdings

1. The concurrence proposes that when a deed, will, or other conveyance contains a general grant or reservation of all minerals without clear qualifying language, courts should reasonably assume that the parties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate. The mineral estate should include all substances presently valuable in themselves, whether known or unknown at the time of conveyance, and all substances that become valuable through development of the arts and sciences.
2. The majority properly did not decide the Department's argument concerning the legal meaning of mineral because trial counsel stipulated that limestone was a mineral and failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

Questions Presented

1. What legal meaning should be given to the word "mineral" when used in a deed, will, contract, or other instrument conveying or reserving an interest in land?
2. Whether a general grant or reservation of all minerals, without clear qualifying language, should be construed to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate and include substances presently or prospectively valuable through development of the arts and sciences.

Disposition

other