State v. Spaeth

343 Wis. 2d 220 (2012) · Supreme Court of Wisconsin · July 13, 2012

Summary

The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that statements made by Joseph Spaeth to Oshkosh police were derived from compelled, incriminating statements he made during a probation-related polygraph examination. Because the police statement was not obtained from a source wholly independent of the compelled testimony, it was protected by derivative-use immunity despite a valid Miranda warning. The court reversed Spaeth’s convictions and ordered suppression of the compelled statements, the police statement, and evidence derived from either statement in any subsequent criminal trial, while stating that the rule does not apply to a revocation hearing.

Court
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Writing for the Court
David T. Prosser, J.; Abrahamson, J.; Prosser, J.; Roggensack, J.
Jurisdiction
Wisconsin
Decision date
July 13, 2012
Procedural posture
Spaeth appealed convictions entered after no-contest pleas to four counts of child enticement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted certification from the court of appeals to determine whether his statement to police, obtained after compelled admissions to his probation agent during a polygraph examination, was protected by derivative use immunity.
Standard of review
The court accepted the circuit court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and reviewed de novo the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
Precedential value
Published Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Joseph J. Spaeth v. State of Wisconsin
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

criminal procedurefifth amendmentright to counselsuppression of evidenceprobation

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawevidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Spaeth's admissions to his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination were compelled, incriminating, testimonial statements protected by use and derivative use immunity.
  2. Whether Spaeth's subsequent statement to police was derived from a source wholly independent of the compelled probation-agent statements under Kastigar and State v. Evans, despite a valid Miranda warning and a finding that the police statement was voluntary.
  3. Whether the attenuation doctrine could permit use of the police statement or its fruits after police learned of the alleged offenses through the compelled statements.
  4. Whether the compelled statements and derivative evidence could nevertheless be used in a probation-revocation hearing.

Holdings

  1. Spaeth's admissions during the probation polygraph examination were compelled, incriminating, testimonial evidence because Wisconsin law and the conditions of his supervision required participation and truthful answers under threat of sanctions, including possible revocation.
  2. The statement Spaeth gave to Oshkosh police was derived from his compelled probation-agent statements and therefore was not derived from a source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
  3. A valid Miranda warning, waiver, and finding that the police statement was voluntary do not overcome derivative use immunity arising from earlier compelled, incriminating, testimonial statements.
  4. The attenuation doctrine does not permit use of a statement or evidence derived from compelled, incriminating, testimonial probation statements merely because time passed or the interrogators changed.
  5. The exclusion of Spaeth's compelled statements and derivative evidence applies to subsequent criminal trials but does not bar use of the compelled statements in a probation-revocation hearing.

Key quotations

Thus, Spaeth's statement to police was not derived from a source "wholly independent" from his compelled testimony, as required by Kastigar and State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977), even though the statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. (343 Wis. 2d at 224)
Consequently, Spaeth's statement to officers is subject to derivative use immunity and may not be used in any subsequent criminal trial. (343 Wis. 2d at 251)
The passage of time does not sever a clear linkage to compelled, incriminating, testimonial evidence. (343 Wis. 2d at 246)

Factual background

While on probation for first-degree sexual assault of a child, Spaeth was required under Wisconsin's probation and sex-offender supervision system to participate in a polygraph examination and answer questions truthfully or face sanctions, potentially including revocation. During the examination process, he made incriminating admissions to his probation agent about physical contact with minors, and the agent disclosed those admissions to Oshkosh police. Police then obtained a detailed statement from Spaeth after placing him in custody, advising him of his Miranda rights, and obtaining a waiver.

Procedural history

The circuit court denied Spaeth's motion to suppress his statements, finding that his statement to police was voluntary and admissible. After an initial jury trial and convictions for sexual assault of a child, the circuit court ordered a new trial because extraneous prejudicial information had reached the jury. Spaeth then pleaded no contest to amended child-enticement charges and received concurrent sentences. The circuit court again denied post-conviction relief, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Remand instructions

Reverse the circuit court judgment and suppress Spaeth's compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to Oshkosh police, and any evidence derived from either statement in any criminal trial. The rule does not apply to a probation-revocation hearing.

Court Document

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