Brad Skinner v. The State of Wyoming

Summary

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed Brad Skinner’s convictions for aggravated assault and battery and his life sentence as a habitual criminal. The court addressed juror misconduct, a hearing-impaired juror, the defendant’s absence from a juror-misconduct hearing, battered-woman-syndrome testimony, and other evidentiary and due-process claims. It concluded that any errors were harmless or did not warrant reversal.

Holdings

1. Improper juror communication or investigation alone does not require reversal; the defendant must also show prejudice. Because the trial court promptly held an appropriate hearing, the juror's inquiry concerned only the completed guilt phase, and the habitual-criminal phase concerned only prior convictions, Skinner was not prejudiced and the juror could remain empaneled.
2. A defendant seeking reversal based on a juror's inability to hear must demonstrate prejudice by showing that the juror failed to hear material portions of the trial. Skinner failed to make that showing.
3. Skinner had a constitutional right to be present at the fact-finding hearing concerning the juror's communications, but his absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it created no reasonable possibility of prejudice.
4. The State may not use battered-woman-syndrome testimony as a prosecutorial tool to covertly introduce expert evidence about batterers' dynamics and propensities to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with a batterer profile during the charged incident. The testimony here was inadmissible profile or character evidence, but its admission was harmless.
5. Detaining a material witness and agreeing to dismiss charges for avoiding service if the witness testified truthfully did not, on this record, coerce the victim's testimony or violate Skinner's due-process rights. The victim's credibility was for the jury, and the appellate court would not second-guess the jury's credibility determination.
6. Skinner failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the victim's alleged methamphetamine use and withdrawal because he made no offer of proof showing whether she used methamphetamine, suffered withdrawal, or how either condition affected her testimony.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing a juror who engaged in improper out-of-court communications and an attempted personal investigation to remain on the jury for the habitual-criminal proceeding.
2. Whether Skinner was prejudiced by the inclusion of a juror who was hard of hearing.
3. Whether Skinner was denied his right to be present at the hearing concerning the juror's misconduct.
4. Whether expert testimony concerning battered-woman syndrome and the general characteristics and escalation patterns of batterers was inadmissible profile or character evidence.
5. Whether the State's detention and treatment of the victim as a material witness coerced her testimony and violated Skinner's due-process rights.
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding questioning concerning the victim's alleged methamphetamine use and withdrawal when Skinner made no offer of proof.

Disposition

affirmed