Summary
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that a statutory personal-property lien under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. generally depends on possession of the property, subject to specified statutory exceptions. Because the jury found both that McTiernan converted Jellis’s cattle and that McTiernan was entitled to a lien against the same cattle, the verdicts were legally inconsistent and could not be harmonized. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a lien under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. is possessory and generally requires the lien claimant to have possession of the personal property.
- Whether a jury verdict finding liability for conversion while also finding entitlement to a lien against the same cattle is inconsistent as a matter of law.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the defendants' motion for a new trial based on the inconsistent verdict.
Holdings
- A lien under Chapter 7 of Title 29 is a possessory lien, and the claimant must have lawful initial possession of the subject personal property to assert the lien, subject to statutory exceptions for owner consent, timely filing before voluntarily releasing possession, or involuntary termination of possession followed by timely perfection.
- A finding that McTiernan was entitled to a lien against Jellis's cattle was legally inconsistent with a finding that McTiernan converted the same cattle.
- The district court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial because the jury's inconsistent verdict was contrary to law and could not be reconciled.
Key quotations
“We again conclude a lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. is possessory and a person must have possession of the article to assert such a statutory lien.” (¶ 19)
“Because the jury found McTiernan entitled to a lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-101 et seq. against Jellis’ beefalo herd, as a matter of law McTiernan could not have converted the same.” (¶ 24)
“A lien under Chapter 7 of Title 29 is possessory and its existence dependent upon possession of the subject personal property.” (¶ 26)
Factual background
Jellis purchased a beefalo herd from McTiernan and later arranged to keep the herd on McTiernan's ranch under an oral agreement whose terms were disputed. Jellis characterized the arrangement as a grazing lease, while McTiernan characterized it as an agistment under which he possessed and cared for the cattle. After the parties' relationship deteriorated, McTiernan locked the gates, filed a lien statement for claimed unpaid amounts, and retained the cattle until their court-ordered release. The jury found both that McTiernan converted the cattle and that he was entitled to a statutory lien against them.
Procedural history
Jellis sued McTiernan and the other appellants after McTiernan locked the gates to the cattle pasture and filed a lien statement concerning Jellis's beefalo herd. The district court permitted release of the cattle after Jellis posted a statutory bond. After trial, the jury found McTiernan liable for conversion and awarded Jellis damages, but also found McTiernan entitled to a lien and awarded him payment for feed and pasturage. The district court denied post-trial motions and entered judgment on the verdict. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the verdict was legally irreconcilable and remanded for a new trial.
Remand instructions
Conduct a new trial. The jury must determine whether the parties' oral agreement was an agistment involving McTiernan's lawful possession of the cattle or a grazing lease under which he lacked possession. The special verdict form should also permit a finding that McTiernan is owed money under a grazing lease even if he is not entitled to a lien and is liable for conversion.