Iris Smith Congleton, as guardian of Coleman C. Smith, Appellant, v. Elaine Sansom, as personal representative of the Estate of Vera I. Smith, deceased, Appellee.

Iris Smith Congleton, as guardian of Coleman C. Smith, Appellant, v. Elaine Sansom, as personal representative of the Estate of Vera I. Smith, deceased, Appellee., 664 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) · District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District · No. No. 95-297

Summary

Under Florida’s slayer statute, a criminal conviction is not required to disqualify a killer from inheriting; the probate court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional. An adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity does not preclude a civil finding that the killing was intentional and unlawful, because an act is intentional if the actor understood the physical nature and consequences of the act, even if unable to distinguish right from wrong. The trial court’s finding that the husband intentionally and unlawfully killed his wife was supported by competent evidence, including his 911 call and statements to police.

Holdings

  1. A criminal conviction is not required; in the absence of a conviction, the probate court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional.
  2. The slayer statute can apply to an insane killer if the killing was intentional and unlawful. Insanity does not automatically preclude a civil finding that the act was intentional or unlawful for purposes of the slayer statute.
  3. The evidence, including the 911 call, statements to police, and the trial court's evaluation of expert testimony, supported the findings that Mr. Smith intentionally killed his wife and was not legally insane at the time, making the killing unlawful for purposes of the slayer statute.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the slayer statute could be applied in a probate proceeding in the absence of a criminal conviction.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in applying the slayer statute to a person adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity.
  3. Whether the killing was a 'legal accident' outside the slayer statute's purview.
  4. Whether the personal representative met the burden of proving the killing was intentional and unlawful by the greater weight of the evidence.

Disposition

affirmed

Cases Cited (36)

  • Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956)(distinguished_by_statutory_change)
  • In re Estate of Howard, 542 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(followed)
  • Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1995)(cited)
  • Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995)(cited)
  • Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956)(followed)
  • Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986)(followed)
  • Prasad v. Allstate Insurance Co., 644 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1994)(followed)
  • Beene v. Gibraltar Indus. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ind.App. 290, 63 N.E.2d 299 (1945)(cited)
  • Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966)(cited)
  • Huff v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 14 Ohio App.3d 135, 470 N.E.2d 236 (1984)(cited)

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