Summary
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, granted panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted this opinion affirming Andrew Ducksworth’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the officer had individualized reasonable suspicion to pat down Ducksworth based on the circumstances of the traffic stop, including the driver’s firearm and related conduct. The court also rejected Ducksworth’s sufficiency and Second Amendment challenges.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the officer had particularized, reasonable suspicion that Ducksworth was armed and dangerous sufficient to conduct a Terry pat-down.
- Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish the prior-conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because Ducksworth stipulated only to a felony conviction and not to a specific predicate felony or its relationship to permanent lifetime disarmament.
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment facially or as applied to Ducksworth.
Holdings
- The officer had reasonable, individualized suspicion that Ducksworth was armed and dangerous, based on the driver's concealed firearm and dishonesty, the connection between the driver and passenger, the high-crime nighttime setting, and Ducksworth's conduct during the encounter. The district court therefore properly denied the motion to suppress.
- Ducksworth's stipulation that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year established the prior-conviction element of § 922(g)(1) as a matter of law. The Supreme Court's decision in Diaz did not require proof of a specific predicate felony supporting permanent lifetime disarmament, and Ducksworth failed to show plain error.
- Ducksworth's facial challenge was foreclosed by Diaz, and his as-applied challenge was foreclosed because he possessed the firearm while on parole. The district court properly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.
Key quotations
“We agree with the First Circuit that “it would be beyond folly for our court to ask police officers to ignore the clear relevance of discovering a hidden firearm on the driver”—especially when the driver lied about having a weapon.” (6)
“The Supreme Court has specifically held that allegation of a specific predicate felony is not required.” (8)
“Because this stipulation “uses the very language of the statute that defines that element of the offense[,]” see § 922(g)(1), Ducksworth “stipulated that the element is satisfied as a matter of law.”” (9)
Factual background
During a nighttime traffic stop for a defective tag light, the driver lacked identification and proof of insurance, possessed a concealed firearm, and initially lied about having it. The officer stopped the vehicle in an area he identified as high crime and then asked passenger Andrew Ducksworth to exit; Ducksworth said he was paralyzed from the waist down and had begun opening the door before being ordered out. During a pat-down, the officer felt an object between Ducksworth's legs, and officers later removed a loaded firearm from his pants and learned he was a convicted felon.
Procedural history
Ducksworth was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court denied his motion to suppress the firearm and his motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. After Ducksworth stipulated to every element of the offense and presented no evidence, the district court found him guilty and sentenced him to thirty-six months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Fifth Circuit granted panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, substituted this opinion, and affirmed.