Hajdusek v. United States

Hajdusek v. United States, 895 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2018) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · July 11, 2018 · No. 17-2137

Summary

The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of an FTCA suit, holding that the discretionary function exception barred claims by a Marine Corps poolee injured by a superior's order to perform an unusually strenuous workout. The court found that decisions regarding the intensity and duration of physical training in the Delayed Entry Program are discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis, balancing preparation and attrition. The court noted that a decision might lose protection if it constitutes a patent abandonment of policy goals, but the alleged conduct here did not cross that line.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Writing for the Court
Kayatta; Torruella; Selya
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
July 11, 2018
Docket number
17-2137
Procedural posture
Appeal from dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Standard of review
De novo review of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA discretionary function exception.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Joseph S. Hajdusek v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

subject matter jurisdictionsovereign immunitymilitary law

Practice areas

TortsGovernment Liability

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act bars Hajdusek's claim for injuries sustained during a Marine Corps DEP physical training session.

Holdings

  1. The discretionary function exception bars Hajdusek's claim because the Marine's decision regarding the intensity and duration of the workout was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis.

Key quotations

The district court concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred the suit and dismissed the case. For the following reasons, we must affirm. (at 146)
The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis. (at 147)
Determining just how hard a potential Marine should exercise, and whether, for example, he should do so for 120 or 90 minutes, calls for weighing the policy goals that are furthered by strenuous, even exhaustive exercise against the goals of avoiding attrition through injury or otherwise. (at 147)

Factual background

Joseph Hajdusek participated in the Marine Corps Delayed Entry Program (DEP), a program for individuals who have enlisted but not yet entered active duty. In March 2011, Staff Sergeant Mikelo, the manager of Hajdusek's recruiting station, ordered Hajdusek to appear for a physical training session. During the session, Mikelo put Hajdusek through a workout that was much longer and more strenuous than any previous workout, with minimal water breaks. Hajdusek collapsed several times. He later developed rhabdomyolysis and became permanently disabled.

Procedural history

Hajdusek sued the United States under the FTCA in the District of New Hampshire. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, concluding that the discretionary function exception barred the suit. Hajdusek appealed.

Court Document

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