Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Commonwealth could seek relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from an adverse midtrial legal ruling concerning the communication element of the charge of threatening to use deadly weapons. The court construed G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), to require communication of a threat to use or have dangerous weapons at a specified place or location, but not communication to an intended victim; however, communication solely between coconspirators or coventurers is insufficient. The judgment denying the Commonwealth’s petition was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Commonwealth could seek relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from an adverse legal ruling or intended ruling during an ongoing criminal trial.
- Whether G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), requires proof that a threat to use or have present a deadly, dangerous, or destructive device was communicated to an intended target or potential victim.
- Whether communication of the threat to coconspirators or coventurers satisfies the communication element of G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b).
Holdings
- A party may seek emergency relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from an adverse ruling or order occurring during an ongoing trial, although a single justice ordinarily may deny relief when the record is unclear or appellate intervention would disrupt the trial.
- A conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), does not require proof that the threat was communicated to an intended target or potential victim. The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant willfully communicated, or caused to be communicated, a threat that a listed deadly, dangerous, or destructive device, substance, or item would be used or present at a specified place or location.
- Communication solely among coconspirators or coventurers does not satisfy the communication element of G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b). The communication must be to someone outside the group of persons jointly planning the threatened crime.
Key quotations
“The statute specifies no details with respect to potential victims, or even requires that there be potential victims.” (449 Mass. at 651-652)
“The essential difference between the two statutes is this: under G. L. c. 275, § 2, threatening another with a crime against his person or property, in circumstances justifying belief in the threatener’s ability and intent to carry out the crime, is the punishable crime; under G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), the punishable crime is the communication of a threat that a deadly, dangerous, or destructive device, substance, or item will be used, or present, at a specified place or location, regardless whether such weapons are actually present or intended to be used.” (449 Mass. at 654-655)
“To do so would render the statute’s required element of communication essentially meaningless” (449 Mass. at 655)
Factual background
The defendant participated in a group plan to attack Marshfield High School with firearms, explosives, incendiary materials, and other weapons, targeting students, teachers, administrators, and resource officers. The group discussed and prepared the plan and attempted to recruit two people outside the core group, who rejected participation and reported the plan to authorities. The defendant was arrested, and police seized weapons-related materials, maps, and other evidence from his home and computer.
Procedural history
Kerns was tried as a youthful offender in the Brockton Division of the Juvenile Court Department on charges including threatening to use deadly weapons and conspiracy to commit mass murder. After the Commonwealth presented its evidence, the judge entered a required finding of not guilty on promotion of anarchy but denied required-finding motions on the remaining charges. During trial, the judge indicated that he intended to require communication of the threat to an intended victim. The Commonwealth sought relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3; a single justice denied the petition, but stayed the Juvenile Court proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated that judgment, allowed the petition, and remanded for further proceedings under the court's interpretation of the statute.
Remand instructions
Vacate the judgment denying the Commonwealth's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition; enter judgment allowing the petition; direct the Juvenile Court judge to instruct himself on G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), consistently with the opinion; vacate the stay; and remand to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.