Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial judge improperly permitted a forensic expert who did not participate in the victim’s rape-kit examination to testify about how the tested swabs were collected. Because the testimony constituted testimonial hearsay and deprived the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witness regarding collection and chain-of-custody procedures, the error was prejudicial. The court vacated the defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, and also concluded that the closed rape-shield hearing did not comply with the required courtroom-closure analysis.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court improperly admitted testimonial hearsay concerning how DNA swabs were collected through an expert who lacked personal knowledge of the collection and could not be meaningfully cross-examined about chain of custody and evidence-handling procedures.
- Whether the admission of the expert's testimony was prejudicial and required a new trial.
- Whether the Sixth Amendment public-trial right applies to a rape-shield hearing.
- Whether a courtroom may be closed during a rape-shield hearing solely because Massachusetts General Laws chapter 233, section 21B requires an in camera hearing, without the four-part analysis required by Waller v. Georgia.
- What remedy is appropriate for failure to conduct the Waller analysis before closing a rape-shield hearing.
Holdings
- An expert who did not participate in or observe a rape-kit examination may not testify on direct examination to testimonial hearsay concerning how the tested swabs were collected when the expert cannot meaningfully be cross-examined about the reliability of those underlying representations.
- The evidentiary error was prejudicial because the challenged testimony supported the victim's account of penetration and undermined the defendant's competing account on a central issue.
- The Sixth Amendment public-trial right applies to a rape-shield hearing because the hearing can materially affect the trial, involves factual determinations, and is neither a routine administrative matter nor trivial.
- Although chapter 233, section 21B requires an in camera rape-shield hearing, that statutory requirement cannot mandate closure without a case-specific determination under Waller v. Georgia.
- Failure to make Waller findings before closing a rape-shield hearing does not automatically require a new trial; the appropriate remedy is generally a remand for a determination whether closure would have been justified and, if necessary, a new rape-shield hearing.
Key quotations
“First, the Greineder rule only allows an expert, on cross-examination, to present the specific underlying facts, derived from hearsay statements, on which the expert relied.” (472 Mass. at 715)
“Where the only answer that the expert can give to questions concerning the chain of custody and evidence-handling protocols is “I don’t know,” a defendant has been deprived of the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination.” (472 Mass. at 716)
“A court room closure may be permissible, provided the party seeking the closure satisfies the four-part test articulated in Waller.” (472 Mass. at 723)
“We also stress the narrowness of our holding: we do not determine that this particular rape shield hearing should have been open to the public, much less that all rape shield hearings must be open to the public.” (472 Mass. at 728)
Factual background
The victim attended a party at Jones's home, consumed alcohol and marijuana, became severely ill, and later testified that Jones digitally and penilely penetrated her while she was incapacitated. Jones testified that he only briefly touched the outside of her vagina and that the sexual contact was consensual. The Commonwealth introduced DNA evidence identifying Jones's saliva on vaginal and genital swabs collected during a sexual-assault examination, but presented the collection details through a laboratory expert who had not participated in or observed the collection. The defense also sought to introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual relationship with the first complaint witness, leading to a closed rape-shield hearing.
Procedural history
A Superior Court jury convicted Jones in May 2011. The trial judge later denied Jones's motion for a new trial based on closure of the courtroom during a rape-shield hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court held that testimonial hearsay concerning the collection of DNA swabs was improperly admitted and prejudicial, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. It also held that the rape-shield hearing was improperly closed without the individualized analysis required by Waller, while explaining that the closure issue independently warranted a new trial only under specified circumstances.
Remand instructions
The convictions were vacated and set aside, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial and other proceedings consistent with the opinion. If the defendant again seeks to introduce evidence of prior sexual interactions with the first complaint witness, the trial judge must conduct a new rape-shield hearing and make the individualized findings required by Waller before closing the courtroom. The jury at any new trial must be instructed under Commonwealth v. Mountry regarding voluntary intoxication and what the defendant reasonably should have known about the complainant's capacity to consent.