Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Robert L. Upton’s convictions, including murder in the first degree, and affirmed the denial of his motions for a new trial. The court held that the defendant’s submissions concerning an alleged undisclosed plea agreement with the Commonwealth’s key witness did not raise a substantial issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying Upton's second motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing on the alleged undisclosed plea agreement with the Commonwealth's key witness.
- Whether newly discovered evidence, including Christopher's later contradictory testimony and subsequent guilty plea, established a Brady violation or otherwise cast real doubt on Upton's convictions.
- Whether the unobjected-to testimony that Upton said, "I've done this before," created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
- Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce or set aside the first-degree murder verdict.
Holdings
- The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing because Upton's submissions did not contain sufficient credible information to raise a substantial issue concerning an undisclosed plea agreement.
- Upton was not entitled to a new trial because the record did not establish an undisclosed plea agreement, and the later evidence would not have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations or cast real doubt on the justice of the convictions.
- The testimony that Upton said, "I've done this before," did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
Key quotations
“To demonstrate an adequately substantial issue to receive an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's submissions "need not prove the [motion's] factual premise . . . but they must contain sufficient credible information to cast doubt on the issue" (quotations and citations omitted).” (slip op. at 13-14)
“Even if we were to assume that Christopher's civil action testimony were newly discovered and credible evidence, the defendant could only prevail on the second motion for a new trial if that newly discovered evidence would have been a "real factor" in the jury deliberations so as to "cast real doubt on the justice of the conviction."” (slip op. at 22-23)
“Newly discovered evidence that impeaches a key witness's credibility usually does not warrant a new trial.” (slip op. at 23)
Factual background
Upton was convicted of shooting Aris Manoloules during a scheme involving Upton's nephew, Christopher Manoloules, and Christopher's father, Treefon. Christopher was the Commonwealth's key witness, and the Commonwealth's case was also supported by corroborating testimony, ballistics evidence linking Upton's Ruger pistol to the murder, evidence that Upton hid the weapon, inconsistent statements to police, and a text message indicating an expected payment from his brother-in-law. Years after trial, Christopher testified in related civil litigation that he had received an undisclosed plea agreement, but the motion judge found that testimony unreliable and self-serving.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Upton of murder in the first degree, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed assault in a dwelling house. The Superior Court denied Upton's second motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the alleged undisclosed plea agreement involving the Commonwealth's key witness was not sufficiently supported and that the witness's later testimony would not have cast real doubt on the convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the convictions and new-trial rulings under G. L. c. 278, § 33E and affirmed.