Summary
The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment and injunctive relief against Fremont Christian School for providing employer-paid health insurance to married male employees but generally not to married female employees. The court held that Title VII's religious-institution exemption did not bar sex-discrimination claims, that the BFOQ and Equal Pay Act defenses were unavailable, and that applying the statutes did not violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses. The court concluded that eliminating the discriminatory policy served a compelling interest and imposed minimal interference with the school's religious beliefs and practices.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Title VII's religious-institution exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 exempts the school's sex-based health-insurance policy.
- Whether the bona fide occupational qualification exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) applies to the discriminatory provision of health benefits.
- Whether the health-insurance policy is based on a factor other than sex under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv).
- Whether application of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to the policy violates the Free Exercise Clause.
- Whether the injunction creates excessive entanglement between government and religion under the Establishment Clause.
- Whether summary judgment was proper despite the factual issues identified by Fremont Christian.
Holdings
- Section 702 of Title VII exempts religious institutions only with respect to employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the institution's religious activities; it does not exempt the school from liability for sex discrimination in employee benefits.
- The BFOQ exception does not apply to the school's discriminatory provision of health-insurance benefits.
- The school's head-of-household rationale does not establish that the unequal health-insurance benefits were based on a factor other than sex under the Equal Pay Act.
- Applying Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to require equal health-insurance benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
- The application of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, including the injunction, did not create excessive government-church entanglement.
- Summary judgment for the EEOC was proper because the material factual issues identified by Fremont Christian were either undisputed or presented questions of law, and the employer's asserted justification was conclusively shown to be pretextual.
Key quotations
“religious employers are not immune from liability [under Title VII] for discrimination based on ... sex....” (¶ 15)
“Because the impact on religious belief or practice is minimal and the interest in equal employment opportunities is high, the balance weighs heavily in favor of upholding Fremont Christian's liability under Title VII for its sexually discriminatory health insurance compensation program.” (¶ 31)
“churches are not—and should not be—above the law.” (¶ 44)
Factual background
Fremont Christian School, owned and operated by the Assembly of God Church, provided health insurance as a fringe benefit only to employees it considered heads of household—single employees and married men. Married female employees were generally ineligible because the school regarded their husbands as the heads of household, although temporary coverage could be provided when a husband was unable to provide for the family. The school defended the policy as grounded in religious beliefs concerning the husband's role in marriage and argued that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were barred by statutory exemptions and the First Amendment.
Procedural history
Ruth P. Frost filed a sex-discrimination charge with the EEOC concerning the school's health-insurance policy. The EEOC sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted the EEOC partial summary judgment on liability, later denied reconsideration, and entered injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.