Summary
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Gary Van Pilon's federal habeas corpus petition challenging his Washington robbery convictions. The court held that a district court's limitation of a certificate of probable cause does not restrict appellate review, and concluded that the eyewitness identification procedures were sufficiently reliable and did not require an evidentiary hearing. The court also rejected Pilon's challenges concerning prior convictions and the deadly-weapon jury instruction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a district court's limited certificate of probable cause may restrict the issues the court of appeals may review in a habeas appeal.
- Whether the district court erred by denying habeas relief on the eyewitness-identification claim without an evidentiary hearing or independent review of lineup photographs.
- Whether denial of a motion in limine concerning prior convictions deprived Pilon of a constitutional right to testify and whether the claim was procedurally barred.
- Whether failure to give a separate beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction concerning the deadly-weapon finding violated federal due process.
Holdings
- A district court's certificate of probable cause cannot legally limit the scope of the court of appeals' review to the issues listed in the certificate.
- The district court properly denied habeas relief without an evidentiary hearing because the record fairly supported the reliability of the identifications and the state courts had reliably resolved the relevant factual issues.
- Pilon's federal habeas claim concerning the motion in limine was procedurally barred because he failed to renew the motion at trial or make an offer of proof and failed to show cause for that default.
- The failure to give a separate beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction concerning whether Pilon was actually armed with a deadly weapon did not violate federal due process because it did not infect the entire trial or render it fundamentally unfair.
Key quotations
“We agree with the Third and Sixth Circuits that the scope of our review cannot be limited by a certificate of probable cause.” (¶ 10)
“In-court identification testimony is inadmissible as a violation of due process whenever: (1) a pretrial encounter is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and (2) the identification is not sufficiently reliable to outweigh the corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure.” (¶ 23)
“The failure to give that instruction did not infect Pilon's trial nor render it fundamentally unfair.” (¶ 52)
Factual background
Pilon was arrested six days after a pharmacy robbery and placed in a lineup viewed by five witnesses. One witness unequivocally identified him, another identified him tentatively or alternatively, and the lineup was interrupted when tape on Pilon's face slipped and an officer reapplied it in view of the witnesses. At trial, several witnesses identified Pilon, although the participating woman testified that the male robber was someone else. Pilon did not testify and was convicted of two armed first-degree robberies.
Procedural history
Pilon was convicted in Washington state court of two counts of first-degree robbery, with a special finding that he was armed with a deadly weapon, and received two concurrent life sentences. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Washington Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting state remedies, Pilon sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied the petition on summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing and issued a certificate of probable cause limited to the eyewitness-identification claim. The Ninth Circuit held that the certificate could not legally restrict its review and affirmed the district court on all claims.