Summary
The Sixth Circuit considered whether state-law handicap-discrimination and workers' compensation retaliation claims brought by unionized Chrysler employees were completely preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Applying Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., the court held that the claims could be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement and were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's rulings concerning the claims at issue and directed remand of Smolarek's action to state court.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether section 301 completely preempted Smolarek's Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act claim and made removal proper.
- Whether section 301 preempted Fleming's Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act claim.
- Whether section 301 preempted Fleming's Michigan-law retaliatory-discharge claim based on his expressed intent to file a workers' compensation claim.
Holdings
- Smolarek's well-pleaded Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act claim was not completely preempted by section 301 because it asserted an independent statutory duty not to discriminate and did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Removal was therefore improper, and the district court erred in denying remand.
- Fleming's Michigan-law retaliatory-discharge claim was not preempted by section 301 because resolution of the claim required factual determinations concerning the employer's conduct and motivation, not interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
- Fleming's Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act claim was not preempted by section 301 because the prima facie issue was whether Chrysler took adverse employment action because of his handicap, a factual question that did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Key quotations
“the state-law remedy ... is 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that matters for Sec. 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” (879 F.2d at 1329)
“The question is a factual one: What was Chrysler's motivation?” (879 F.2d at 1332)
Factual background
Smolarek, a longtime Chrysler employee and UAW member with a seizure disorder, was laid off after Chrysler determined that no work was available within his medical restrictions. He alleged that Chrysler refused to return him to his former position because of his handicap and fear that he might suffer a seizure and file a workers' compensation claim. Fleming, also a UAW member, was injured, worked with restrictions, was allegedly assigned inconsistent work and harassed after expressing an intent to file a workers' compensation claim, and was later laid off. Both employees asserted state-law handicap discrimination claims, and Fleming also asserted retaliatory discharge.
Procedural history
Smolarek filed suit in Michigan state court, Chrysler removed the action, and the federal district court denied remand and dismissed the case for failure to exhaust intra-union remedies. Fleming filed suit in Michigan state court, Chrysler removed it, and the district court denied remand, held all claims preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and granted Chrysler summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the relevant rulings and remanded.
Remand instructions
The Fleming case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The Smolarek order denying remand was reversed, and Smolarek's case was ordered remanded to Michigan state court.