United States v. Lee Edward Blomquist

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · October 7, 2020 · No. Nos. 19-2111/2112

Summary

The Sixth Circuit held that a defendant's voluntary consent to a search can cure an otherwise invalid warrantless search of structures not covered by a warrant. The court affirmed the denial of suppression, finding that Blomquist's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances—he was cooperative, intelligent, experienced with law enforcement, and led officers on a tour after being Mirandized, with no coercion or duress. Key factors included the defendant's age, education, criminal history, and the absence of threats or force. The case addresses the interplay between warrant scope, consent, and the Fourth Amendment.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Amul Thapar; Danny J. Boggs; Jane B. Stranch
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
October 7, 2020
Docket number
Nos. 19-2111/2112
Procedural posture
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette, denying motion to suppress evidence.
Standard of review
Clear error: 'Since consent is a question of fact, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and reverse only for clear error.'
Precedential value
published
Parties
Lee Edward Blomquist v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurefourth amendmentsearch and seizureevidencestandard of review

Practice areas

Criminal LawConstitutional Law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court erred in denying Blomquist's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the chicken coop and greenhouses on the ground that he voluntarily consented to the search under the Fourth Amendment.

Holdings

  1. Blomquist's actions demonstrated consent and other factors did not contaminate that consent; therefore, the search was valid and the district court did not clearly err in denying the motion to suppress.

Key quotations

The government bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence, through clear and positive testimony, that the consent was voluntary, unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion. (4)
We will uphold a finding of consent to a warrantless search unless we are left with a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' (3)

Factual background

Blomquist manufactured and distributed marijuana in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. Police obtained a warrant to search his father's property. When they arrived, Blomquist was walking out of a chicken coop. After being handcuffed and given Miranda warnings, he waived his rights and agreed to talk. He claimed his operation was legal medical marijuana and offered to show officers his paperwork. He then led officers on a tour of the chicken coop (which was on his cousin's property, not covered by the warrant) and greenhouses, showing them marijuana plants, and later showed them a locked attic room with processed marijuana. The chicken coop and greenhouses were not on the property covered by the warrant, but Blomquist consented to the search.

Procedural history

Blomquist was charged with federal drug crimes. He moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search, arguing that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The district court denied the motion, finding that Blomquist voluntarily consented to the search. Blomquist appealed.

Court Document

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