Summary
This Sixth Circuit opinion addresses whether the Family and Medical Leave Act permits an employee to take leave to care for an adult sibling who has become incapacitated due to illness. The court analyzes the statutory definition of "in loco parentis," concluding that such relationships can form between adults and remanding the case for the district court to determine if the plaintiff actually assumed a parental role over her sister. Additionally, the court affirms the district court's award of statutory penalties for the employer's violation of COBRA notice requirements while reversing its grant of summary judgment on several other claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether an in loco parentis relationship under the FMLA may form between adults, including adult siblings, after the onset of an adult disability.
- Whether Chapman presented sufficient evidence for her FMLA interference claim to proceed to further consideration.
- Whether Chapman presented a triable FMLA retaliation claim based on her termination and MAG's allegedly false statements to unemployment authorities.
- Whether MAG's Rule 11 letter constituted actionable FMLA retaliation on the summary-judgment record.
- Whether Chapman presented a triable associational-disability-discrimination claim under the ADA.
- Whether Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A) recognizes associational disability-discrimination claims.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding $85 per day in COBRA statutory penalties.
Holdings
- An in loco parentis relationship under the FMLA can form between adults, including adult siblings; the relationship need not begin while the dependent person is a minor, need not arise before the onset of disability, and does not require a childhood-onset disability.
- The district court erred by granting MAG summary judgment on Chapman’s FMLA interference claim without evaluating whether Chapman and Sharon actually formed an in loco parentis relationship; the claim was remanded for that determination.
- The district court improperly narrowed Chapman’s theory of FMLA retaliation and must analyze whether MAG terminated her in retaliation for requesting FMLA leave, regardless of whether she was ultimately entitled to the leave.
- Submitting allegedly false statements to an unemployment authority may constitute a materially adverse action for purposes of an FMLA retaliation claim, and the district court erred by granting MAG summary judgment on this claim.
- The district court properly granted MAG summary judgment on the retaliation claim based on its Rule 11 letter because the record did not contain sufficient evidence that the letter was unfounded retaliatory conduct.
- The district court erred by treating Chapman’s ADA claim as challenging only termination for absences; Chapman could proceed on a theory that MAG fired her based on a discriminatory assumption that she would be distracted by her disabled sister.
- Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A) encompasses associational disability-discrimination claims, and the district court must evaluate Chapman’s state-law claim on remand.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Chapman $85 per day in statutory penalties for MAG’s COBRA notice violation.
Key quotations
“This list is not exclusive, no single factor is dispositive, and they should not be weighed like a math problem.” (at 20)
“We decline this invitation to collapse these two concepts into one.” (at 24)
Factual background
Chapman worked as a finance manager for MAG while caring for her adult sister, Sharon, who had terminal cancer and became unable to care for herself. Chapman requested FMLA leave, asserting that she had assumed parental-like caregiving responsibilities for Sharon, but MAG denied the request on the ground that siblings were not covered. After Chapman failed to appear at the beginning of a modified work schedule, MAG fired her, later reported to Ohio unemployment authorities that she had quit, threatened possible Rule 11 sanctions if she sued, and failed to provide COBRA continuation-coverage notice.
Procedural history
Chapman sued Brentlinger Enterprises under the FMLA, the ADA, analogous Ohio law, and COBRA, alleging interference with FMLA rights, retaliation, associational disability discrimination, and failure to provide COBRA notice. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the employer summary judgment on all claims except COBRA, found a COBRA notice violation, and imposed an $85-per-day statutory penalty. Both parties appealed.
Remand instructions
On remand, the district court must reconsider Chapman’s FMLA interference claim under the common-law in loco parentis standard; analyze the FMLA retaliation claims based on termination and allegedly false unemployment-benefit statements; evaluate the ADA and Ohio associational-disability claims; and consider MAG’s mitigation defense as appropriate. The district court must retain the grant of summary judgment on the Rule 11-letter retaliation claim and the $85-per-day COBRA penalty.