Summary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviews the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of an alien's application for cancellation of removal. The court independently interprets the statutory phrase "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," holding that it requires hardship significantly greater than that normally expected from deportation and finding no express congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the agency under Loper Bright. Applying this standard to the record, the court concludes the petitioner failed to demonstrate the required level of hardship to his qualifying relatives and denies the petition for review.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)'s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a legal standard that courts must interpret independently or one whose meaning the Board of Immigration Appeals may define through delegated discretion.
- What “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” means under § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
- Whether Moctezuma-Reyes established that removal would cause his qualifying United States-citizen children hardship substantially different from or greater than the hardship normally resulting from removal.
Holdings
- The BIA has no delegated discretion to define the statutory eligibility standard because § 1229b(b)(1)(D) contains no express language authorizing the agency to exercise judgment, form an opinion, or find that the standard is satisfied.
- The phrase means hardship to qualifying relatives that is significantly different from or greater than the hardship normally experienced by families when an alien is deported. Moctezuma-Reyes did not satisfy that standard because the financial and emotional difficulties identified were ordinary consequences of removal and the remaining circumstances did not make the hardship truly exceptional.
Key quotations
“Because “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” goes to eligibility, it follows that the BIA has no discretion to define this standard.” (124 F.4th at 419)
“Chevron is no more. Before we defer to the agency, we must find that the statute expressly confers discretion on the agency.” (124 F.4th at 420)
“So, we conclude that “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” means hardship sustained by a deported alien’s qualifying relatives that’s significantly different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.” (124 F.4th at 421)
“In sum, “the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard must be limited to ‘truly exceptional’ situations.”” (124 F.4th at 423)
Factual background
Moctezuma-Reyes, a Mexican citizen who entered the United States unlawfully in 2005, lived in Michigan with his wife, two United States-citizen sons, an adult daughter who was a DACA recipient, and a niece. He and his adult daughter jointly supported the family with approximately $50,000 in annual income, and he also supported an older son in Mexico. He argued that removal would cause his two young sons exceptional and extremely unusual financial and emotional hardship, but the record showed that the family planned to remain in the United States, his daughter could help mitigate financial hardship, he had not shown that he could not work in Mexico, and the children lacked compelling special needs or an absence of support.
Procedural history
The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Moctezuma-Reyes in 2018. An Immigration Judge denied his application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted or affirmed that decision, and Moctezuma-Reyes petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review.