Darel K. Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corporation and Columbus McKinnon Corporation

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addresses whether Kansas comparative-fault law permits apportionment of fault among nonparty or “phantom” parties in a products-liability action. The court holds that comparison of fault was substantively permissible and that the issue concerning Manitowoc Engineering was tried by consent, but the inclusion of Lummus Company lacked adequate notice and evidentiary support. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Holdings

1. Kansas law permits the comparison of the causal fault of nonparties with that of the plaintiff and defendants in products-liability actions, including strict-liability actions.
2. Kansas law requires comparison of all types and degrees of causal fault, including strict products liability, ordinary negligence, and the plaintiff's own fault.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the issue of Manitowoc Engineering's fault was tried by consent and that the pretrial order was thereby impliedly amended.
4. The district court abused its discretion by submitting Lummus Company's fault to the jury as a phantom party.
5. The entire case, rather than merely the apportionment issue, required retrial because the issues were so intertwined that a limited retrial would not adequately correct the error.
6. The district court did not err in denying summary judgment because reasonable minds could differ on whether Hardin's alleged abnormal use of the jack was reasonably foreseeable.
7. The district court properly denied the directed-verdict motions because Manitowoc-Forsythe's opening statement constituted a judicial admission that it sold the crane and jack involved in the case.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Kansas law permits comparison of fault among defendants, the plaintiff, and nonparty 'phantom parties' in a strict-products-liability action.
2. Whether the fault of Manitowoc Engineering and Lummus Company was tried by consent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), permitting their inclusion as phantom parties despite the pretrial order.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by submitting Lummus Company's fault to the jury.
4. Whether the district court properly denied Manitowoc-Forsythe's motion for summary judgment based on the foreseeability of Hardin's alleged abnormal use of the jack.
5. Whether the district court properly denied Manitowoc-Forsythe's motions for a directed verdict concerning evidence that it sold the crane and jack.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded