Summary
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a products-liability judgment involving allocation of fault among defendants, the plaintiff, and nonparty “phantom” parties under the Kansas Comparative Negligence Act. It held that Kansas law permits comparison of fault in strict-liability cases, and that the fault of Manitowoc Engineering was properly submitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). However, the court concluded that Lummus Company was improperly included because the plaintiff lacked adequate notice and a fair opportunity to defend, and it ordered a new trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Kansas law permits comparison of the causal fault of nonparty phantom parties in a strict-products-liability action.
- Whether Kansas comparative-fault principles require comparison of a plaintiff's ordinary negligence with a defendant's strict-liability fault.
- Whether the fault of Manitowoc Engineering and Lummus Company was tried by consent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), permitting their inclusion as phantom parties despite the pretrial order.
- Whether the district court properly applied a directed-verdict standard when determining whether Lummus Company could be submitted as a phantom party.
- Whether the district court erred in denying Manitowoc-Forsythe's motion for summary judgment based on foreseeability and its directed-verdict motions concerning proof of sale.
Holdings
- Kansas law permits the fault of nonparty phantom parties to be compared with the fault of named defendants in a products-liability action.
- Under Kansas law, the causal fault of a plaintiff may be compared with the strict-liability fault of a products-liability defendant.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the issue of Manitowoc Engineering's fault was tried by consent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).
- The district court abused its discretion by finding that the issue of Lummus Company's fault was tried by consent and by submitting Lummus as a phantom party.
- A phantom party may be submitted to the jury only when the evidence would be sufficient to withstand a directed verdict if that party had actually been sued.
- The district court properly denied Manitowoc-Forsythe's summary-judgment motion concerning foreseeability and its directed-verdict motions concerning proof that it sold the crane and jack.
Key quotations
“Under the doctrine of comparative fault all parties to an occurrence must have their fault determined in one action, even though some parties cannot be formally joined or held legally responsible.” (454)
“The test of consent is whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether he could have presented additional evidence had he known sooner the substance of the amendment.” (457)
“Defendants intending to avoid liability by asserting phantom party fault delay raising the identity of those parties at their peril.” (460)
Factual background
Hardin was injured in an on-the-job accident allegedly caused by a defectively designed push-pull jack attached to a Manitowoc crane. The crane was leased to Hardin's employer through related corporate entities, and the jack was manufactured by Columbus-McKinnon. The jury apportioned fault among the named defendants, Hardin, and several nonparty phantom parties, including Manitowoc Engineering and Lummus Company.
Procedural history
The district court permitted the jury to compare the fault of the named defendants, plaintiff, and three phantom parties under the Kansas Comparative Negligence Act. The jury attributed 12.5% fault to Lummus Company, 9% to Manitowoc Engineering, 45% to Combustion Engineering, 20% to Hardin, 13.5% to Columbus-McKinnon, and none to Manitowoc-Forsythe. The Tenth Circuit held that Lummus was improperly submitted as a phantom party, rejected the cross-appeal concerning Manitowoc-Forsythe, and ordered a new trial on all issues.
Remand instructions
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial on all issues. On retrial, the district court was directed to follow the interpretation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a set forth in Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.