Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.

490 U.S. 212 (1989) · Supreme Court of the United States · April 25, 1989 · No. No. 87-2098

Summary

The Supreme Court considered whether Section 7005 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 unconstitutionally delegated Congress's taxing power to the Secretary of Transportation by authorizing pipeline safety user fees. The Court held that delegations under the Taxing Clause are subject to the same nondelegation standards as delegations under other congressional powers and that Section 7005 provided sufficient guidance and limitations. The Court reversed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Justice O'Connor
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
April 25, 1989
Docket number
No. 87-2098
Procedural posture
Direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a district court judgment declaring § 7005 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
Standard of review
Constitutionality of a federal statute under the nondelegation doctrine; de novo review.
Precedential value
Published Supreme Court precedent; binding nationwide.
Parties
Skinner, Secretary of Transportation v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.
Disposition
reversed

Topics

separation of powersconstitutional lawtaxadministrative lawstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

constitutional lawadministrative lawtax lawpipeline regulation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether § 7005 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 unconstitutionally delegated Congress's taxing power to the Secretary of Transportation.
  2. Whether delegation of authority under the Taxing Clause is subject to a stricter nondelegation standard than delegations under Congress's other enumerated powers.
  3. Whether the pipeline safety assessments were invalid because they were taxes rather than user fees.

Holdings

  1. Section 7005 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority because Congress provided sufficiently detailed standards governing the Secretary's assessment of pipeline safety fees.
  2. The Constitution does not require a stricter nondelegation standard when Congress delegates discretionary authority under its taxing power.
  3. The Court did not need to decide whether the pipeline safety user fees were taxes because § 7005 would be constitutional under the ordinary nondelegation standard even if the assessments were taxes.

Key quotations

We hold that it is not. (490 U.S. at 212)
We have no doubt that these multiple restrictions Congress has placed on the Secretary's discretion to assess pipeline safety user fees satisfy the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine as we have previously articulated them. (490 U.S. at 220)
Even if the user fees are a form of taxation, we hold that the delegation of discretionary authority under Congress' taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges. (490 U.S. at 223)

Factual background

Section 7005 of COBRA directed the Secretary of Transportation to establish annual user fees on operators of certain natural-gas and hazardous-liquid pipelines. The fees were required to bear a reasonable relationship to specified measures of pipeline usage, could be used only for administering the federal pipeline safety statutes, and could not exceed 105 percent of the relevant congressional appropriations. Mid-America, a hazardous-liquid pipeline operator, challenged its assessment as an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's taxing power.

Procedural history

The Secretary assessed Mid-America Pipeline Company $53,023.52 in pipeline safety user fees. Mid-America paid under protest and sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the magistrate recommended, and the District Court adopted, the conclusion that § 7005 unconstitutionally delegated Congress's taxing power to the Executive Branch. The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

Court Document

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