Summary
The Supreme Court considers whether a sentencing disparity resulting from Congress’s nonretroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court holds that such a disparity, considered alone or in combination with other factors, cannot establish eligibility for a sentence reduction. The Court further concludes that the Sentencing Commission’s contrary 2023 policy statement is invalid to that extent.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
- Whether a district court may consider that nonretroactive sentencing disparity in combination with other factors when determining eligibility for compassionate release.
- Whether the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement permitting consideration of certain unusually long sentences and nonretroactive changes in law is consistent with § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
Holdings
- When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting disparity between a preamendment sentence and the sentence that would apply under current law cannot itself serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
- A nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release either by itself or in combination with other factors.
- To the extent the Sentencing Commission's policy statement permits a nonretroactive change to § 924(c) to establish eligibility for compassionate release, the policy statement is invalid because it conflicts with the governing statute.
Key quotations
“When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the fact that a preamendment sentence is longer than it would have been postamendment is not an “extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]” that “warrant[s]” a sentence reduction.” (8)
“This gatekeeping requirement is not, as petitioners seem to believe, a free-for-all. It is a distinct analytical step that imposes independent and ascertainable limits on access to compassionate release.” (14)
“The statutory text and structure make clear that Congress’s nonretroactive change to §924(c)—considered by itself or in combination with other factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” (16)
Factual background
Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies in 2003 and was convicted of two § 924(c) counts, resulting in a 32-year mandatory minimum for those counts and a total sentence exceeding 42 years. Johnnie Markel Carter participated in armed bank robberies in 2007 and was convicted of three § 924(c) counts, receiving a 70-year sentence, including 57 years from stacked mandatory minimums. The First Step Act later eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for first-time offenders sentenced after the Act, but Congress did not make that change applicable to defendants sentenced before enactment. Both petitioners sought compassionate release based on the sentencing disparity, along with individualized circumstances.
Procedural history
Rutherford and Carter were separately convicted and sentenced in federal district courts for multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated § 924(c)'s stacking requirement for certain defendants but did not make the change applicable to defendants sentenced before enactment, each petitioner sought compassionate release based in part on the resulting sentencing disparity. The district courts denied relief, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the nonretroactive amendment could not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.