Summary
The Alaska Supreme Court held that state action is required to pursue a constitutional privacy claim against a private employer. It affirmed summary judgment for Safeway on Miller's race, religion, gender, and constitutional privacy claims, finding insufficient evidence of discriminatory impact or treatment and inadequate notice of a religious conflict. The court reversed the denial of Miller's motion to amend his complaint to add wrongful discharge and breach-of-implied-covenant claims, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether state action is required to assert a claim under article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution against a private employer.
- Whether Miller presented sufficient evidence of disparate-treatment or disparate-impact racial discrimination under AS 18.80.220.
- Whether Miller established a prima facie case of religious discrimination by showing that he notified Safeway of a conflict between his religious beliefs and the grooming policy.
- Whether Safeway's different hair-length requirements for male and female employees constituted gender discrimination under AS 18.80.220.
- Whether the superior court abused its discretion by denying Miller leave to amend his complaint as untimely.
- Whether the proposed claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and wrongful discharge were futile.
- Whether the proposed common-law invasion-of-privacy claim was futile.
Holdings
- State action is required to pursue a cause of action under article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, and Miller could not assert that constitutional privacy claim against private employers Safeway and Galic.
- Miller failed to establish a prima facie case of racial disparate-treatment discrimination under AS 18.80.220 because he did not show that Safeway treated him less favorably than similarly qualified non-Native employees.
- Miller failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination because he presented no studies, research, testimony, or other adequate evidence showing that Safeway's hair-length policy had a significant discriminatory impact on Alaska Native men.
- Miller failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because he did not notify Safeway that his hairstyle or hair length was connected to his religious or spiritual beliefs.
- Safeway's different hair-length requirements for male and female employees did not constitute unlawful gender discrimination under AS 18.80.220 on the facts presented.
- The superior court abused its discretion by denying Miller leave to amend solely as untimely where the trial date had been vacated, discovery had been reopened on relevant issues, and Safeway would not suffer undue prejudice.
- It was premature to conclude that Miller's proposed claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and wrongful discharge were futile.
- The proposed stand-alone common-law invasion-of-privacy claim was futile because Miller refused to cut his hair, so no privacy intrusion occurred.
Key quotations
“But because the trial court must freely grant leave to amend a complaint, and no prejudice would have resulted to Safeway in light of the trial court's decision to vacate the trial date and reopen discovery on certain issues, we reverse the trial court's denial of Miller's motion to amend his complaint and remand for a determination whether Safeway breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or wrongfully terminated Miller.” (285)
“Miller must demonstrate that the voters of Alaska clearly intended that the privacy amendment should apply to both public and private action.” (290)
“Because Miller did not give notice to Safeway regarding his religious beliefs or the fact that his hairstyle was tied to his spiritual beliefs, he has not satisfied the second requirement.” (293)
“Yet prejudice to the opposing party is the predominate factor in determining whether or not to grant leave to amend.” (294)
“We conclude that state action is required for a cause of action under Alaska's constitutional right of privacy, we AFFIRM the trial court's decision on this issue.” (296)
Factual background
Frank Miller, an Athabascan Indian and member of the Kenaitze tribe, worked as a sales clerk for Carrs, later acquired by Safeway. He had worn his hair shoulder length or longer throughout his life, and the store initially allowed him to keep it long if tied back despite a policy limiting men's hair to collar length. After the store was scheduled to close, Safeway told Miller that he could transfer only if he cut his hair; Miller refused and was terminated. Miller asserted that his hairstyle reflected his personality, spirituality, and Alaska Native tradition, but he did not present evidence that the grooming policy disparately affected Alaska Native men or that he had notified Safeway that his hairstyle conflicted with religious beliefs.
Procedural history
Miller sued Safeway and Galic after Safeway terminated him for refusing to cut his long hair under the employer's grooming policy. The superior court granted Safeway's motion for summary judgment on Miller's constitutional privacy and race, religion, and gender discrimination claims, denied his motion to amend to add claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful discharge, and common-law invasion of privacy, and dismissed the action. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment rulings, reversed the denial of leave to amend as to the implied-covenant and wrongful-discharge claims, held the common-law privacy amendment futile, and remanded.
Remand instructions
The superior court must reconsider Miller's motion to amend and allow amendment to assert claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and wrongful termination, then determine the merits of those claims. The common-law invasion-of-privacy amendment remains futile. The summary judgment rulings on constitutional privacy and race, religion, and gender discrimination remain affirmed; attorney's fees awarded below are vacated.