McHenry Solar, LLC v. Town of Hampton

0 Conn. App. 1 · Connecticut Appellate Court · September 23, 2025 · No. AC 47636

Summary

This Connecticut Appellate Court opinion addresses whether the generation of solar electricity qualifies as "manufacturing" under General Statutes § 12-81(76) for purposes of claiming a personal property tax exemption. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, arguing that its equipment transformed tangible personal property into electricity. The appellate court affirmed, holding that legislative intent and prior precedent establish that electricity generation does not constitute manufacturing under the statute, thus rendering the plaintiff ineligible for the exemption.

Court
Connecticut Appellate Court
Writing for the Court
Cradle, C. J.; Suarez, J.; DiPentima, J.
Jurisdiction
Connecticut
Decision date
September 23, 2025
Docket number
AC 47636
Procedural posture
The plaintiff appealed from an interlocutory appeal authorized under Connecticut Practice Book § 61-4(a) after the trial court denied its motion for summary judgment in a property-tax exemption claim.
Standard of review
Summary judgment and statutory construction are reviewed plenarily. The appellate court determines whether the trial court's legal conclusions are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the memorandum of decision.
Precedential value
published; precedential
Parties
McHenry Solar, LLC v. Town of Hampton
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

property taxstatutory interpretationtax court procedureappellate procedure

Practice areas

property taxationtax appealsstatutory interpretationsummary judgmentappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the generation of electricity constitutes manufacturing within the meaning of the personal-property-tax exemption in General Statutes § 12-81(76).
  2. Whether the generation of electricity alternatively constitutes processing or fabricating under the definitions incorporated into General Statutes § 12-81(76).
  3. Whether Public Act 92-193 abrogated or superseded United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo's conclusion that businesses engaged in generating electricity are not entitled to the applicable manufacturing exemption.

Holdings

  1. The generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of General Statutes § 12-81(76), and equipment used to generate electricity therefore does not qualify for that manufacturing property-tax exemption.
  2. The plaintiff's alternative arguments that electricity generation constitutes processing or fabricating do not establish eligibility for the exemption.
  3. Public Act 92-193 did not overrule or abrogate Groppo's interpretation excluding businesses engaged in electricity generation from the manufacturing exemption.

Key quotations

We therefore conclude that the generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of § 12-81 (72) and (76), and thus that the court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (at 23)
We therefore conclude that the generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of § 12-81 (72) and (76) (at 20-21)

Factual background

McHenry Solar owns personal property at a Hampton solar facility, including solar modules, inverters, racking, controls, monitoring systems, transformers, meters, switchboards, wiring, and enclosures. The equipment is used to generate solar electricity that McHenry Solar sells to Connecticut Light & Power Company. The plaintiff claimed that the equipment was machinery and equipment used for manufacturing and therefore exempt from personal property taxation under General Statutes § 12-81(76).

Procedural history

The Town of Hampton tax assessor denied McHenry Solar's request for an exemption from taxation on personal property used at its solar facility. McHenry Solar brought a tax appeal under General Statutes § 12-119 in the Superior Court and moved for summary judgment on its claim that the property qualified for the manufacturing exemption under General Statutes § 12-81(76). The Superior Court denied the motion, authorized an immediate appeal under Practice Book § 61-4(a), and the Appellate Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings; the plaintiff's separate claim that the assessment was manifestly excessive remained pending.

Remand instructions

The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The plaintiff's separate claim challenging the assessment as manifestly excessive remains pending.

Court Document

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