Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that injuries caused by a severed steel signpost embedded in a grassy highway shoulder constituted injuries caused by a highway defect under General Statutes § 13a-149. Because that statute provided the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy and he had not complied with its notice requirements, the trial court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional vagueness challenge to § 13a-149.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the condition alleged to have caused Ferreira's injuries constituted a highway defect within the meaning of General Statutes § 13a-149 even though it was located on a grassy shoulder rather than the paved portion of the road.
- Whether § 13a-149 was the exclusive remedy for claims pleaded against municipal employees and agents in their individual capacities when the allegations sought to impose liability on the municipality for conduct within the scope of employment or contractual duties.
- Whether failure to provide the notice required by § 13a-149 deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
- Whether § 13a-149 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ferreira's claims or improperly deprived him of a remedy.
Holdings
- A condition located on a highway shoulder may constitute a highway defect when it is in, upon, or near the traveled path and obstructs or hinders legitimate travel. The signpost remnant on the grassy shoulder, where bus passengers were expected to disembark, constituted a highway defect as a matter of law.
- Claims nominally brought against municipal employees, officers, or agents in their individual capacities are subject to the exclusive-remedy rule of § 13a-149 when the allegations seek to impose liability on the municipality for acts performed within the scope of employment or contractual duties.
- Providing statutory notice to the municipality within ninety days of the injury is a condition precedent to maintaining an action under § 13a-149. Failure to provide that notice deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
- Section 13a-149 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ferreira and does not improperly deprive him of a remedy because established Connecticut precedent gave fair warning that a defect on a highway shoulder could fall within the statute.
Key quotations
“We conclude that, as a matter of law, the allegations contained in the plaintiffs complaint, the allegations in the affidavits submitted by the defendants, absent any response from the plaintiff, and the other uncontro-verted evidence, necessarily invoke the defective highway statute.” (341)
“As a condition precedent to maintaining an action under § 13a-149, a plaintiff must provide a municipality with notice within ninety days of the accident.” (354)
“We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that § 13a-149 is unconstitutionally vague.” (357)
Factual background
On June 12, 1996, Geraldo Ferreira was a passenger on a public bus in East Lyme, Connecticut. While disembarking onto a grassy embankment at the shoulder of North Bridebrook Road, he tripped on the remnant of a severed steel signpost embedded in the ground and fell backward into the road, where the bus ran over him. The pleadings and unchallenged affidavits established that the defect was within the town highway right-of-way, approximately seven feet from the paved roadway, and that the town was responsible for maintaining the shoulder.
Procedural history
Ferreira filed two related actions arising from injuries sustained when he tripped on a severed steel signpost while disembarking from a public bus onto a grassy shoulder. In the Southeast action, defendants moved to strike on the ground that the claim concerned a highway defect and could be brought only under General Statutes § 13a-149. In the Pringle action, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ferreira had not provided the statutory notice required by § 13a-149. After consolidating the actions, the trial court concluded that the allegations invoked the defective highway statute, that the complaints were legally insufficient because they did not plead § 13a-149, and that the lack of statutory notice deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the Pringle action, and the Supreme Court affirmed.