State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed Judson Brown’s convictions for two counts of first-degree arson and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree arson. The court rejected his claims that the prosecutor engaged in a pervasive pattern of misconduct during voir dire, examination of his self-representation and trial techniques, closing argument, and comments concerning the dangers to firefighters and witness credibility. The court also concluded that the unpreserved claims did not warrant review under the applicable plain-error or Golding standards.

Holdings

1. The prosecutor's questions were proper because voir dire permits inquiry designed to uncover potential juror prejudice, including sympathy or bias concerning a defendant's self-represented status.
2. The prosecutor's comments were proper advocacy and permissible argument concerning the evidence and reasonable inferences from Brown's cross-examinations; they did not improperly attack Brown's pro se status.
3. The prosecutor's references to the risks faced by firefighters and the victim's insurance conduct were permissible comments on the evidence, witness credibility, and statutory elements, rather than improper emotional appeals.
4. The claim was not established. The cited comments did not naturally and necessarily constitute comments on Brown's failure to testify, and portions of the claim were inadequately briefed and therefore not reviewed.
5. The alleged misconduct did not deprive Brown of a fair trial, and the unpreserved claims did not satisfy the requirements for Golding review. The judgment was affirmed.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the prosecutor's questioning during voir dire concerning sympathy for Brown's pro se status constituted prosecutorial misconduct that deprived him of a fair trial.
2. Whether the prosecutor improperly criticized Brown's cross-examinations and self-represented trial techniques.
3. Whether the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's emotions by referring to the dangers faced by firefighters and urging the jury to be outraged by the victim's insurance conduct.
4. Whether the prosecutor impermissibly commented on Brown's failure to testify in violation of the Fifth Amendment and General Statutes § 54-84.
5. Whether the alleged misconduct, considered cumulatively, constituted plain error or a constitutional deprivation requiring a new trial.

Disposition

affirmed