Summary
The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Cindy L. Bransfield’s convictions for using an expired registration number while prescribing a controlled substance under 16 Del. C. § 4756(a)(2). The court held that writing and delivering prescriptions while her Delaware controlled-substance registration was expired constituted use of an expired registration number, despite the number not appearing on the prescriptions. The court also declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved vagueness challenge and concluded there was no plain error.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Bransfield used an expired registration number in the course of prescribing a controlled substance under 16 Del. C. § 4756(a)(2).
- Whether the statutory terms "use" and "registration number" are unconstitutionally vague under due process principles.
- Whether the unpreserved vagueness claim could be reviewed on appeal.
Holdings
- A practitioner uses an expired registration number within the meaning of § 4756(a)(2) by writing and delivering controlled-substance prescriptions when the practitioner's underlying Delaware registration and associated registration number have expired, even if the Delaware registration number is not printed on the prescriptions.
- The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bransfield used an expired registration number while prescribing a controlled substance.
- The court declined to review the vagueness claim because Bransfield did not raise it below; alternatively, the statute would not be unconstitutionally vague because it gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement.
Key quotations
“Because a Delaware registration number can only be obtained as a result of registering with the relevant State agency, and is valid for only as long as the registration is valid, those terms (registration and registration number) are, for all practical purposes, synonymous.” (¶ 9)
“Although penal statutes must be strictly construed, they must also be interpreted to achieve a common sense result and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable or absurd results.” (¶ 10)
Factual background
Cindy Bransfield, a nurse practitioner, wrote two prescriptions for the controlled substance Endocet to an undercover detective during September 2006. Her Delaware controlled-substance registration had expired in July 2005, although her federal DEA registration remained valid, and the prescriptions listed the DEA registration number but not the Delaware registration number. Bransfield had been advised that she lacked prescriptive authority until renewal, and her efforts to renew or appeal the expiration remained unresolved when she wrote the prescriptions.
Procedural history
Bransfield was tried in the Superior Court after being charged with two class F felonies under 16 Del. C. § 4756(a)(2). The jury found her guilty, and the Superior Court denied her pretrial motion in limine and motion for judgment of acquittal. She appealed the final judgment to the Supreme Court of Delaware, which affirmed.