Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a defendant who willfully breached a conditional plea agreement could be resentenced without violating double jeopardy. It further held that the 60-day filing period in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(g)(2)(A) is nonjurisdictional and that the defendant waived any timeliness objection by failing to raise it.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether resentencing a defendant who willfully breached a conditional plea agreement violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- Whether the sixty-day period in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(g)(2)(A) for the State to move to vacate a plea and sentence is jurisdictional.
- Whether the defendant waived an objection to the State's untimely motion by failing to raise it in the trial court.
Holdings
- The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar resentencing when a defendant willfully refuses to perform a condition of a bargained-for plea agreement. Metellus's contradictory sworn accounts constituted substantial noncompliance with his agreement to testify truthfully.
- The sixty-day period for the State to move to vacate a plea and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(g)(2)(A) is nonjurisdictional because the rule permits the period to be altered by a statement made when the plea is entered.
- Metellus waived any objection to the State's motion as untimely by failing to raise the objection in the trial court.
Key quotations
“The double jeopardy clause does not protect a defendant from reprosecution or resentencing if the defendant willfully refuses to perform a condition of a plea bargain.” (494)
“Because this particular provision allows the time limit to be altered, then, as the Fifth District reasoned, the rule cannot be jurisdictional.” (495)
Factual background
Metellus entered a conditional plea agreement requiring him to testify truthfully against codefendants in exchange for concurrent sentences capped at thirty years. He twice testified under oath that Jonel Ocer and Tony Elozar participated in the charged crimes and reaffirmed that testimony. Before testifying against Elozar, Metellus demanded a reduced sentence and then testified that Elozar had no involvement and that his prior statements were lies, causing the case against Elozar to be dismissed. The State moved seventy-four days later to vacate Metellus's sentence, and the trial court found substantial noncompliance and resentenced him.
Procedural history
Metellus pleaded guilty to specified counts in six informations in exchange for concurrent sentences capped at thirty years and an agreement to testify truthfully against codefendants. After he repudiated his prior testimony at a codefendant's trial, the State moved more than sixty days later to vacate his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(g). The trial court found substantial noncompliance and resentenced him to twenty-nine years on each count. The Fifth District affirmed, holding that resentencing did not violate double jeopardy and that the rule's sixty-day filing period was nonjurisdictional and had been waived by Metellus's failure to object.