Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 843.085(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which criminalized wearing or displaying law-enforcement indicia that could deceive a reasonable person, was unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and violative of substantive due process. The court concluded that the statute lacked a specific intent-to-deceive requirement and could reach protected expression and innocent conduct. The court quashed the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision, approved the conflicting decision in Rodriguez v. State, and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether section 843.085(1), Florida Statutes (2001), is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment and article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.
- Whether section 843.085(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair notice and adequate standards against arbitrary enforcement.
- Whether section 843.085(1) violates substantive due process by criminalizing innocent conduct and lacking a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.
Holdings
- Section 843.085(1) is facially overbroad because, without an intent-to-deceive or scienter requirement, it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expressive conduct, including innocent wearing or display of law-enforcement words or indicia.
- Section 843.085(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair notice of when wearing or displaying the listed words or law-enforcement indicia subjects a person to prosecution and invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
- Section 843.085(1) violates substantive due process because it may punish entirely innocent activities and lacks a sufficient reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental objective of preventing deceptive law-enforcement impersonation.
Key quotations
“We agree with the Third District that section 843.085(1) is unconstitutional.” (906 So. 2d at 1018)
“With no specific intent-to-deceive element, the section extends its prohibitions to innocent wearing and displaying of specified words.” (906 So. 2d at 1021)
“We conclude, however, that the overbreadth underlying this statute is substantial and incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written.” (906 So. 2d at 1022)
Factual background
Kimberly Sult wore a black shirt bearing an official Pinellas County Sheriff's Office star, seal, and the word "SHERIFF" into a convenience store. When officers asked whether she worked for the sheriff's office, she said yes and displayed a sheriff's identification card that she had failed to return after leaving prior employment with the office. The shirt had been purchased from a store open to the public, and the evidence showed that other law-enforcement indicia were commercially available.
Procedural history
Sult was convicted in the trial court of violating section 843.085(1), Florida Statutes (2001), after wearing an official-looking Pinellas County Sheriff's Office shirt and displaying a sheriff's identification card. The trial court rejected her constitutional challenges. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed and certified a constitutional question to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, quashed the Second District's decision, approved the conflicting decision in Rodriguez v. State, and remanded for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The decision of the Second District Court of Appeal was quashed, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Court also approved Rodriguez v. State.