Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a defendant may not be designated a sexual predator based on an offense that did not qualify for that designation under the law in effect at the time of sentencing. The court construed section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2000), and declined to reach the certified procedural due process question concerning retroactive employment restrictions. The court quashed the First District Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2000), authorized a trial court to designate an offender as a sexual predator based on a predicate offense that did not qualify for sexual-predator status under the law in effect at the time of sentencing.
- Whether the retroactive application of the Florida Sexual Predators Act's permanent employment restrictions without a separate hearing on future dangerousness violated procedural due process.
Holdings
- Section 775.21 did not authorize a trial court to impose a sexual-predator designation on an offender whose predicate offense did not meet the statutory sexual-predator criteria at the time of sentencing.
- The court declined to answer whether retroactive imposition of the permanent employment restrictions without a hearing on future dangerousness violated procedural due process.
Key quotations
“We hold that a trial court is without jurisdiction to impose the sexual predator designation, which includes notification and registration requirements in addition to the employment restrictions identified in the certified question, on an offender who, under the law in effect at the time of sentencing, did not qualify as a sexual predator.” (949)
“Read together, subsections (5)(a)(1) and (5)(c) apply only to offenders who could have been designated as sexual predators at the time of sentencing, and therefore excludes offenders who were not eligible when sentenced for an offense later brought within the sexual predator rubric.” (947-948)
Factual background
Therrien committed the offenses in November 1996, when he was sixteen, and was prosecuted as an adult. He pleaded nolo contendere in August 1997 to attempted sexual battery and lewd and lascivious assault; neither offense qualified him as a sexual predator under the law in effect when he was sentenced. Legislative amendments enacted in 1998 and 2000 later made those offenses qualifying offenses, and the State sought a sexual-predator designation more than three years after sentencing. The designation imposed lifetime registration, public-notification, identification, and employment restrictions.
Procedural history
Therrien pleaded nolo contendere in 1997 to attempted sexual battery by a person under eighteen on a person under twelve and lewd and lascivious assault. The trial court withheld adjudication and imposed probation. After statutory amendments made the offenses qualifying offenses under the Florida Sexual Predators Act, the State sought and obtained a sexual-predator designation in 2000. The First District affirmed and rejected Therrien's due-process challenge, and the Supreme Court of Florida accepted review based on certified-question and constitutional jurisdiction but resolved the case on statutory-construction grounds.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion, including removal or reconsideration of the erroneously imposed sexual-predator designation.