Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed an order permitting Robert J. Trease to discharge postconviction counsel and waive further postconviction proceedings after a Durocher/Faretta-type inquiry. The court held that Trease’s waiver was competent, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and denied his later request to reinstate the proceedings based solely on a change of mind. A dissent argued that the pending claims concerning possible innocence and discredited bullet-lead analysis warranted allowing the appeal to proceed.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding Trease competent and by accepting his knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings.
- Whether Trease's subsequent change of mind provided a sufficient basis to reinstate his postconviction proceedings or required another Durocher hearing.
Holdings
- A competent capital defendant may waive postconviction counsel and postconviction proceedings when the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as established through the required Durocher/Faretta-type inquiry.
- A mere change of mind, without a challenge to the validity of the prior waiver, is insufficient to set aside a valid waiver and reinstate postconviction proceedings.
Key quotations
“capital defendants who are competent can waive postconviction counsel and postconviction proceedings” (123)
“the relevant test for competency in the context of waiving collateral counsel and collateral proceedings in Florida is whether the person seeking waiver has the capacity to “understand[ ] the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.”” (125)
“a mere change of mind is an insufficient basis for setting aside a previous waiver.” (126)
Factual background
Trease was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery with a firearm and sentenced to death. After postconviction counsel filed an appeal from the denial of Trease's postconviction motion, Trease moved to discharge counsel and terminate all further appellate and postconviction review. At the Durocher hearing, Trease demonstrated that he understood the consequences of waiver, including the loss of further appellate review and possible effects on federal relief, and stated that his decision was voluntary. Counsel raised concerns about organic brain damage and trauma but did not present expert testimony establishing incompetency.
Procedural history
Trease's conviction and death sentence had been affirmed in 2000. He previously waived and later reinstated postconviction proceedings. After the trial court denied his postconviction motion in 2007, Trease again moved to discharge counsel and terminate further review. Following a Durocher hearing, the trial court found Trease competent and his waiver knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed that order, denied Trease's later request to reinstate the proceedings, and dismissed the appeal from the denial of postconviction relief and the habeas petition.