Summary
The Florida Supreme Court held that shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes, qualifies as a forcible felony under the prison releasee reoffender sentencing statute. The court approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision, disapproved the First District’s conflicting decision in Crapps v. State, and concluded that the vehicle offense necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), is a forcible felony under the prison releasee reoffender statute's catch-all provision.
- Whether the vehicle provision of section 790.19 requires the presence of an individual and therefore necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.
- Whether the rule of lenity applies to the statutory language.
Holdings
- A conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies as a forcible felony under the PRR statute's catch-all provision because the offense necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.
- Section 790.19 is disjunctive and proscribes multiple separate offenses, each with distinct statutory elements.
- The rule of lenity does not apply because, in light of the statutory history and prior interpretations, section 790.19 is not subject to competing reasonable interpretations.
Key quotations
“In holding that the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section 790.19 necessarily involves the threat of physical force or violence to an individual, we disapprove the apparent reasoning of the First District in Crapps” (1065)
“As we find that the offenses of shooting into a building and shooting into a vehicle are separate and distinct crimes for purposes of the Hearns statutory elements test, we find that a conviction under section 790.19 for shooting into an occupied vehicle is a basis for PRR sentencing pursuant to the forcible felony catch-all provision” (1065)
Factual background
Paul was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Because the offense occurred within the relevant period after his release from a state correctional facility, the trial court classified him as a prison releasee reoffender and imposed the fifteen-year mandatory minimum applicable to a second-degree felony. Paul challenged whether the offense qualified as a forcible felony under the PRR statute.
Procedural history
Paul was convicted of shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), and received a fifteen-year prison releasee reoffender sentence under the forcible-felony catch-all provision of section 775.082(9)(a). His Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion challenging the sentence was denied as untimely and successive. The Fourth District summarily affirmed and certified conflict with Crapps; the Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction, approved the Fourth District's decision, and disapproved Crapps.