State v. Johnson

122 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2013) · Supreme Court of Florida · June 27, 2013

Summary

The Florida Supreme Court considers whether the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, defining the relevant statutory maximum for purposes of sentencing, applies retroactively to criminal sentences that became final before Blakely was decided. The court holds that Blakely announced a new rule of law but is not of sufficient fundamental significance to apply retroactively to final sentences or resentences. Accordingly, Blakely provides no basis for postconviction relief concerning a sentence that was final before Blakely issued.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Canady, J.; Canady; Polston; Lewis; Quince; Labarga; Perry; Pariente
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
June 27, 2013
Procedural posture
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review based on an express and direct conflict between the First District Court of Appeal's decision applying Blakely retroactively to a pre-Blakely resentencing and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's contrary decision.
Standard of review
De novo review of the legal question whether a constitutional sentencing rule applies retroactively to final sentences.
Precedential value
Published, binding precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida
Parties
State of Florida v. Sirron Johnson
Disposition
quashed

Topics

sentencingcriminal procedurepost-conviction reliefsixth amendmentdue process

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal proceduresentencingpost-conviction reliefconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Blakely v. Washington announced a new rule of constitutional law or merely clarified Apprendi v. New Jersey.
  2. Whether the Blakely definition of statutory maximum applies retroactively on collateral review to criminal sentences or resentences that became final before Blakely was decided.
  3. Whether Johnson was entitled to postconviction relief based on Blakely's treatment of upward-departure sentences under a sentencing-guidelines scheme.

Holdings

  1. Blakely announced a new rule of law rather than merely clarifying Apprendi.
  2. Blakely does not apply retroactively on collateral review to sentences or resentences that were final when Blakely issued.
  3. Johnson is not entitled to postconviction relief because Blakely affords no pathway to relief concerning a sentence that was final before Blakely issued.

Key quotations

For the reasons explained below, we hold that Blakely does not apply retroactively to final sentences or resentences. (856)
Our precedents make clear, however, that the “statutory maximum” for Ap-prendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant (860)
Accordingly, we conclude that Blakely announced a new rule. (862)
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the new constitutional rule announced in Blakely does not apply retroactively to sentences or resentences that were final when it issued. (866)

Factual background

After a jury trial, Sirron Johnson was convicted of armed kidnapping, armed sexual battery, and armed robbery arising from 1995 offenses. His sentencing-guidelines scoresheet authorized a range of 9.6 to 16 years, but the trial court imposed concurrent upward-departure sentences of 48 years on each count. Johnson's sentence became final in October 2000; he was resentenced in June 2002, before Blakely v. Washington was decided, and later challenged the resentencing under Apprendi and Blakely.

Procedural history

Johnson was convicted after a jury trial and received upward-departure sentences under Florida's sentencing guidelines. After a postconviction motion, he was resentenced in June 2002, before Blakely was decided. He later sought relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that his sentence violated Apprendi and Blakely. The trial court denied relief, the First District reversed and remanded, and the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the First District's decision while approving the Fourth District's contrary decision in Thomas.

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