Summary
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a parking lot across a public street from a school can constitute "real property comprising any school" under the child sex offender presence statute (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a)), rejecting a contiguity requirement. The court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant knowingly was present on school property, given the unified nature of the parish and school, the festival layout, and the defendant's conduct of leaving without protest when told he should not be there. The dissent argued the State failed to prove the knowledge element because no objective signs or other evidence showed the defendant was aware the parking lot was school property.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the St. Louis Avenue parking lot constitutes 'real property comprising any school' within the meaning of section 11-9.3(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly was present on real property comprising a school.
Holdings
- The St. Louis Avenue parking lot is 'real property comprising any school' because it is used for school purposes and owned by the parish that also owns the school; contiguity is not required.
- The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant knowingly was present on real property comprising a school beyond a reasonable doubt.
Key quotations
“It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any school building, on real property comprising any school, or in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity when persons under the age of 18 are present in the building, on the grounds or in the conveyance.” (¶ 28)
“For property to be 'contiguous' with a school, it must be 'touching along a boundary or at a point.' In contrast, property can be 'comprising' a school in multiple situations, as 'comprising' has multiple meanings. Under these definitions, property can be 'comprising' a school if (1) it is 'made up of' the school, (2) it constitutes the school, or (3) it is 'include[d] especially within a particular scope' of the school.” (¶ 32)
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, our inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (¶ 36)
“Pursuant to section 4-5 of the Code a person acts knowingly when he is consciously aware that the circumstances described by the statute defining the offense exist. Moreover, knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.” (¶ 37)
Factual background
Defendant Donald Leib, a registered child sex offender, attended the Queen of Martyrs Fest on September 26, 2015, which was held in a parking lot owned by the parish. The parking lot was across the street from the school gymnasium and was used for school purposes such as student drop-off and athletic events. There were no signs indicating the lot was school property; the only sign advertised church bingo. Defendant was asked to leave by a police officer and complied. The next day, a neighbor told defendant she had filed a police report, and defendant said he understood her concerns.
Procedural history
Defendant was convicted after a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County for being a child sex offender in a school zone. He appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed his petition for leave to appeal.